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CLUSTERED BIAS* 
KATE SABLOSKY ELENGOLD** 
Agencies, advocates, and courts regularly and repeatedly fail 
plaintiffs who have experienced intersectional discrimination 
based on more than one personal identity trait. Nearly thirty 
years after intersectionality theory was first introduced to legal 
scholarship, however, its insights have yet to be effectively 
integrated into antidiscrimination advocacy and doctrine. This 
Article borrows the contributions of intersectionality theory and 
explores its critiques to develop a novel “cluster framework” for 
bridging the divide between the theory and civil rights 
jurisprudence. Using race-sex discrimination as a lens, the 
proposed framework relocates intersectional discrimination 
wholly within a traditionally protected class, illuminating 
similarities and differences in discrimination across groups and 
subgroups. This Article concludes with three concrete proposals 
to implement the cluster framework such that the 
antidiscrimination doctrine will better recognize and remedy 
intersectional discrimination. 
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In 2009, Tametra Moore sued Cricket Communications, Inc. for 
sexual harassment, racial harassment, and retaliation in violation of 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits 
discrimination in employment.1 Tametra is an African American2 
woman.3 She worked in sales at retail Cricket stores in Tennessee and 
Texas.4 In 2008, two years into her employment with Cricket, 
Tametra was subjected to sexual and racial harassment at the hands 
 
 1. Plaintiff’s Original Complaint at 7–11, Moore v. Cricket Commc’ns, Inc., No. 4:09-
cv-03310 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 13, 2009), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Moore Compl.]. The assertions 
related to Tametra Moore set forth in this Introduction and throughout this Article are 
drawn from publicly-available documents in the federal lawsuit and include Ms. Moore’s 
allegations as stated in her complaint and her deposition. Except where specifically noted, 
the information asserted herein was not decided as a matter of fact or law by a court. 
Tametra Moore’s case, however, illuminates the failures of advocacy, agencies, and 
antidiscrimination law to consider and remedy intersectional discrimination regardless of 
whether each individual allegation was, or could have been, proven. 
 2. For reasons I set forth in an earlier work, and keeping with the trend of omitting 
hyphens when using terms that combine ethnicities or nationalities, I employ the term 
“African American” without a hyphen. I also choose to capitalize the terms “Black” and 
“White” unless they appear in a quotation. See Kate Sablosky Elengold, Branding Identity, 
93 DENV. L. REV. 1, 6 n.19 (2015). 
 3. Moore Compl., supra note 1, at 2.  
 4. Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit B at 
17:11-18:13, Moore v. Cricket Commc’ns, Inc., No. 4:09-cv-03310 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2010), 
ECF No. 25-2 [hereinafter Moore Dep.]. 
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of her store manager, Travis.5 Travis repeatedly made sexually 
explicit comments to Tametra in the workplace, discussing his sexual 
prowess and his penis, and stating that he “likes to eat from the ass to 
the pussy.”6 Travis’s sexual vulgarity was connected, in large part, to 
race. Travis asked Tametra if she had “ever been with a white man” 
and told her: “It’s a myth that white man’s have little dicks, because 
my dick is huge.”7 Travis spoke of Black women in sexual and 
derogatory ways, asserting “the blacker the berry, the sweeter the 
juice” and “Black women got better pussy than white women.”8 
Travis showed Tametra and her colleague, Dwan (also a Black 
woman9), a naked photograph of himself and invited them to send 
him naked pictures of themselves.10 Tametra found Travis’s language 
and behavior to be vulgar11 and filed a complaint with his superiors.12 
In spite of a Cricket supervisor’s stated belief that Travis would not 
have made those comments to White women,13 Cricket 
Communications failed to take Tametra’s claims seriously.14 Tametra 
hired a lawyer, filed a charge with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), received a right-to-sue letter, 
and filed suit against Cricket Communications in federal district 
court.15 She asserted three claims: sexual harassment, racial 
harassment, and retaliation.16 After a significant period of discovery 
and motion practice, Tametra endured a four-day trial.17 Having 
received jury instructions and a jury questionnaire explicitly and 
unambiguously separating Tametra’s sexual harassment and racial 
 
 5. Moore Compl., supra note 1, at 1–3. 
 6. Moore Dep., supra note 4, at 155:18–156:25. 
 7. Id. at 158:2–9. 
 8. Id. at 248:6–25. 
 9. Id. at 74:14–17. 
 10. Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment Exhibit A at 
10–11, Moore v. Cricket Commc’ns, Inc., No. 4:09-cv-03310 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2010), ECF 
No. 25-1 [hereinafter Moore EEOC Intake Questionnaire]; Moore Compl., supra note 1, 
at 3. 
 11. Moore Dep., supra note 4, at 157:9–11. 
 12. Moore Compl., supra note 1, at 4. 
 13. Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit C at 
25:17–23, Moore v. Cricket Commc’ns, Inc., No. 4:09-cv-03310 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2010), 
ECF No. 25-3; Moore Compl., supra note 1, at 4. 
 14. Moore Compl., supra note 1, at 4–6. 
 15. Id. at 2. 
 16. Id. at 7–11. 
 17. See Transcript of Trial Day 4 of 4 at 1, Moore v. Cricket Commn’cs, Inc., No. 4:09-
cv-03310 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2011), ECF No. 67. 
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harassment claims,18 the jury found for the defendant, Cricket 
Communications, Inc., on all claims.19 
Tametra’s story is not atypical. Approximately one in five Black 
women report sex discrimination (including sexual harassment) in the 
workplace.20 Black women also report racialized sexual harassment in 
housing, where their experiences of sexual harassment are infused 
with racial animus.21 Those stories of intersectional discrimination—
discrimination based on more than one identity trait—are replicated, 
with different identity characteristics and in different venues—
employment, education, and public accommodations—around the 
country. And yet, Tametra is not alone in her failure to find remedy 
under the current antidiscrimination laws. Tametra, like other women 
of color, was failed by courts, by advocates, and by the federal agency 
tasked with implementing the relevant antidiscrimination statute. 
Each of those entities approached Tametra’s injury, and thus her 
identity, in separate silos, assessing her claim of race discrimination as 
isolated from her claim of sex discrimination in the form of sexual 
harassment. In doing so, each relevant, institutional player ignored 
the ways in which intersectional discrimination, like that experienced 
by Tametra, operates in the real world. 
Scholars, including critical race scholars, predicted and detailed 
the failures of courts, advocates, and agencies to fully implement 
antidiscrimination law for plaintiffs who have identities that cross 
protected classes. Intersectionality theory, introduced to legal 
 
 18. Jury Instructions at 4–6, Moore v. Cricket Commn’cs, Inc., No. 4:09-cv-03310 
(S.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2011), ECF No. 59 [hereinafter Moore Jury Instructions]; Jury 
Questions at 1–2, Moore v. Cricket Commn’cs, Inc., No. 4:09-cv-03310 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 
2011), ECF No. 63 [hereinafter Moore Jury Questions]. 
 19. Moore Jury Questions, supra note 19, at 1–3. 
 20. PEW RESEARCH CTR., ON PAY GAP, MILLENNIAL WOMEN NEAR PARITY - FOR 
NOW: DESPITE GAINS, MANY SEE ROADBLOCKS AHEAD, 50 (2013), 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2013/12/gender-and-work_final.pdf [https://perma.cc
/7E9R-WD54]. Roughly the same percentage of White women report sex discrimination in 
employment. Id. Sexual harassment is a subset of sex discrimination. See Joshua F. 
Thorpe, Note, Gender-Based Harassment and the Hostile Work Environment, 1990 DUKE 
L.J. 1361, 1362 (stating that gender discrimination laws protect employees from employers 
who “demand[] sexual favors as a condition of employment .	.	.	.”). 
 21. See Griff Tester, An Intersectional Analysis of Sexual Harassment in Housing, 22 
GENDER & SOC’Y 349, 353, 355 (2008) (finding that African American women accounted 
for fifty-eight percent of the verified claims of sexual harassment filed with the Ohio Civil 
Rights Commission alleging violations of fair housing laws between 1990 and 2003); see 
also Kate Sablosky Elengold, Structural Subjugation: Theorizing Racialized Sexual 
Harassment in Housing, 27 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 227, 237–42 (2016) (cataloguing 
affidavit, deposition, and trial testimony of women experiencing racialized sexual 
harassment in sex-based discrimination claims brought by the Attorney General of the 
United States under the federal Fair Housing Act). 
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academics by Kimberlé Crenshaw in 1989, seeks to explain and 
analyze the experience of individuals with more than one traditionally 
subordinated personal identity trait: “intersectionality.”22 As applied 
to Tametra’s case, the discrimination she experienced was 
intersectional in that it related both to her race (Black-ness)23 and her 
sex (female-ness). In that way, Tametra’s experience of intersectional 
discrimination is different from single-axis discrimination based only 
on one protected category. Crenshaw explains that a Black woman’s 
experience of bias and discrimination is different from a Black man’s 
experience and different from a White woman’s experience.24 Nor is a 
Black woman’s experience of discrimination an additive experience; it 
is not race discrimination like that experienced by a Black man plus 
sex discrimination like that experienced by a White woman.25 
Some scholars have also challenged the wisdom of relying on 
rights-based antidiscrimination law for equality advancement, arguing 
that such laws were neither drafted nor developed to accommodate 
complex plaintiffs and criticizing the laws for ignoring the actual 
 
 22. Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex; A Black 
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 
1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 140. 
 23. It is worth noting that Tametra could also have proceeded on a colorism 
complaint or on an allegation that the discrimination was based on color. See 42 U.S.C. 
§	2000e (2012). The relationship between race and color protections in antidiscrimination 
law is complicated, murky, and outside the scope of this Article. For further reading on the 
topic, see, Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism: A Darker Shade of Pale, 47 UCLA L. REV. 
1705, 1743 (2000); Elengold, supra note 2, at 23–26; Trina Jones, Intra-Group Preferencing: 
Proving Skin Color and Identity Performance Discrimination, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 657, 677 (2010). 
 24. Kimberle Crenshaw, Race, Gender, and Sexual Harassment, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1467, 1467–68 (1992) (“African-American women by virtue of our race and gender are 
situated within at least two systems of subordination: racism and sexism. This dual 
vulnerability does not simply mean that our burdens are doubled but instead, that the 
dynamics of racism and sexism intersect in our lives to create experiences that are 
sometimes unique to us.”). 
 25. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, 
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1242 (1991); Crenshaw, 
supra note 22, at 140. Intersectionality theory is complemented by the work of anti-
essentialist scholars, who push back against the notion that there is a single shared 
experience for any group or subgroup of individuals. Some anti-essentialism scholars have 
critiqued feminist and anti-racist movements for failing to account for the particular and 
unique experiences of women of color; see also Kathryn Abrams, The Constitution of 
Women, 48 ALA. L. REV. 861, 866–67 (1997); Martha Albertson Fineman, Feminism, 
Masculinities, and Multiple Identities, 13 NEV. L.J. 619, 620 (2013) (citing ELIZABETH V. 
SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT, at 
ix (1988)); Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 
101 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 184 (2001); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist 
Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 585 (1990). 
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needs of subordinated groups in favor of isolated legal rights.26 These 
scholars have done important work to raise our collective 
consciousness about the experiences of women of color and others 
with intersectional identities facing bias and discrimination. 
Intersectionality theory has not, however, been immune from 
critique. Scholars inside and outside of the legal academy have 
complained that intersectionality theory is both under inclusive and 
over inclusive.27 Intersectionality theory has been critiqued as under 
inclusive, or reductionist, because it focuses on the unique and 
incomparable situation of certain intersectional identities to the 
exclusion of others. Intersectionality theory has also been deemed 
over inclusive because each individual is comprised of an infinite 
number of identity traits, crossing an infinite number of axes. Thus, 
critics contend, there are no logical boundaries or study groups. Both 
the under inclusive and over inclusive critiques are barriers to the 
theory’s application to antidiscrimination law and doctrine. As such, 
they represent certain limitations of intersectionality theory to permit 
or encourage understanding and analogizing discrimination across 
groups and subgroups. They also predict, at least in part, courts’ 
general rejection of intersectional discrimination in civil rights 
actions. 
This Article proposes a bridge between intersectionality theory 
and civil rights jurisprudence. Borrowing the insights of 
intersectionality and post-intersectionality theories, which have 
continued to evolve Crenshaw’s original theory and account for some 
of its critiques,28 this Article develops a novel framework to present, 
analyze, and remedy intersectional discrimination within the current 
civil rights doctrine. Using race-sex discrimination as the lens, this 
Article proposes relocating that form of intersectional discrimination 
 
 26. See, e.g., Paulette M. Caldwell, The Content of Our Characterizations, 5 MICH. J. 
RACE & L. 53, 95–96 (1999) (critiquing the rights-based civil rights model because of its 
suggestion that it was developed through the lens of a White experience and fails to 
achieve critical needs for subordinated groups, including social and economic justice); 
Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1363–64 (1984) (critiquing 
rights-based theory for impeding progressive advances). But see Kimberlé Williams 
Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in 
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1356–58 (1988) (acknowledging that the 
civil rights statutes have both been transformative and risk re-legitimizing institutional 
structures that have historically subordinated Blacks); Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical 
Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 
402–05 (1987) (critiquing Critical Legal Studies scholarship’s rejection of rights-based civil 
rights). 
 27. See infra notes 94–105 and accompanying text. 
 28. See infra notes 106–17 and accompanying text. 
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wholly within sex discrimination.29 Relocating the analysis will not 
only preclude the institutional players—the agencies, advocates, and 
courts—from separating and siloing strands of victims’ identities, but 
will also allow scholars and advocates to see connections between 
different subgroup discrimination and overcome the barriers for 
intersectional plaintiffs asserting civil rights violations. 
Part I of this Article sets out the problem—the insights of 
intersectionality theory have failed to take root in civil rights 
advocacy and jurisprudence. Part I exposes failures in three specific 
arenas: antidiscrimination jurisprudence, advocacy, and agencies. Part 
II details the primary limits of intersectionality theory in application 
to antidiscrimination law. It draws the connection between those 
limits and the failures of antidiscrimination doctrine to adequately 
account for intersectional plaintiffs and intersectional discrimination. 
Part III applies the insights derived from intersectionality and post-
intersectionality theories to propose a novel framework for seeking to 
remedy intersectional discrimination through antidiscrimination law. 
Part III proposes (1) reimagining intersectional discrimination 
through an image of coterminous, rather than overlapping, circles of 
protected class identity; (2) relocating intersectional discrimination 
within those coterminous circles and thus, squarely within the 
definition of any one of the relevant categories of prohibited 
discrimination; (3) explicitly defining discrimination to include the 
categorizing, stereotyping, and subjugation of certain subgroups of 
protected classes, thus accounting for the relationship between 
individual discrimination and structural inequities;30 and (4) 
recognizing the full range of harms that flow from complex 
discrimination—to the individual, her community, her subgroup and 
her group. Part III uses race-sex discrimination as the lens to further 
flesh out the components of the cluster framework. Part IV concludes 
with recommendations for implementing the cluster framework in the 
context of the antidiscrimination doctrine. Returning to Tametra’s 
story, Part IV offers three concrete proposals for implementation of 
the cluster framework in the same arenas that have failed 
intersectional plaintiffs—advocacy, agencies, and courts. Although 
 
 29. For the sake of clarity, this Article frames intersectional discrimination through 
the lens of discrimination against women of color, specifically Black women. The insights 
in this Article, however, can easily be applied to intersectional identity outside of race-sex 
intersectionality. 
 30. This Article defines “structural inequities” as inequities based not on individual 
actions or biases, but inequities that arise from the social, cultural, and legal systems that 
were built on and perpetuate unfair, discriminatory, or disproportionate results for certain 
subgroups. For a more complete analysis, see infra Section III.B. 
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the proposals do not perfectly mirror the failures identified in Part I, 
they aim to make inroads toward fixing them. 
The idea that “women’s rights are human rights”31 has taken hold 
nationally and internationally; it is only natural that women of color’s 
rights are clearly identified as both women’s rights and human rights. 
Utilizing the cluster framework, we can reimagine the way that 
current civil rights protections can be laboring oars in the fight for 
racial and gender equality. And by implementing a new framework 
for presenting, analyzing, and remedying intersectional discrimination 
in civil rights cases, one can identify and utilize analogies between and 
across subgroup discrimination. 
I. THE FAILURES OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW TO ADDRESS 
INTERSECTIONAL BIAS 
The failure of antidiscrimination law to adequately address or 
remedy intersectional discrimination is well explored in the academic 
literature. Scholars have shown, in both quantitative and qualitative 
terms, that the current civil rights jurisprudence does not adequately 
account for intersectional plaintiffs or intersectional discrimination. 
In 1994, for example, Kathryn Abrams detailed courts’ rejection of 
and hesitancy about intersectional claims asserted in civil rights 
actions.32 Tracing Title VII case law, Abrams explored the failure of 
the jurisprudence to recognize and remedy complex bias in sex 
discrimination claims, including claims of sexual harassment.33 
Neither the passage of time nor the further development of 
intersectionality theory and its progeny34 have changed the results in 
the courtroom.35 Empirical work provides additional support for the 
 
 31. Hillary Rodham Clinton, First Lady of U.S., Remarks to the U.N. 4th World 
Conference on Women Plenary Session (Sept. 5, 1995) (transcript available at 
http://www.un.org/esa/gopher-data/conf/fwcw/conf/gov/950905175653.txt [https://perma.cc
/WX6P-AF9W]).  
 32. Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female Subject, 92 MICH. L. REV. 
2479, 2494–2517 (1994). 
 33. Id. at 2498. Abrams uses the term “complex claimant” to include “persons 
claiming intersectional forms of discrimination, or manifesting identities that are 
ambivalent in relation to the existing statutory categories .	.	.	.” Id. at 2481. 
 34. See infra Part II. 
 35. Serena Mayeri, Intersectionality and Title VII: A Brief (Pre-)History, 95 B.U. L. 
REV. 713, 730 (2015) (“Twenty years later, judicial opinions containing thoughtful analysis 
of intersectional claims remain few and far between; legal theory and scholarship on 
intersectionality continue to vastly outpace actual Title VII doctrine.	.	.	. There is no robust 
canon of intersectionality case law.” (footnote omitted)). 
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disconnect between intersectionality theory and civil rights doctrine.36 
A 2011 interdisciplinary study of employment discrimination actions, 
for example, concluded that the existence of demographic and/or 
claim intersectionality “dramatically reduce[s the] odds of plaintiff 
victory.”37 In other words, plaintiffs exhibiting identification with 
more than one traditionally subordinated group (“demographic 
intersectionality,”38 also known as a “complex claimant”39 or an 
“intersectional”40) and/or plaintiffs who allege discrimination on the 
basis of overlapping ascriptive characteristics (“claim 
intersectionality”41 or “intersectional discrimination”42) are less 
successful in employment discrimination actions.43 
That failure can be ascribed, in part, to courts, advocates, and 
agencies, all of whom have neglected intersectional plaintiffs by 
failing to recognize, advocate for, and remedy intersectional 
discrimination. This Part details the primary failures of each of those 
institutions with respect to understanding and remedying 
intersectional discrimination. It highlights how courts have allowed 
the structure of antidiscrimination law to limit remedies for 
intersectional discrimination, how advocates have reinforced the 
separation of protected classes with a continued use of stock stories, 
and how agencies’ reliance on standard forms limits allegations and 
prosecution of complex discrimination. The failures of each 
institution are inseparable as to cause and effect; like the chicken and 
egg, the failures in one reinforce and perpetuate the failures in the 
others. 
A. Courts: The Failure of the Siloed Claims 
Why is it that courts are unwilling to address or remedy complex 
discrimination? The answer, much like discrimination itself, is 
 
 36. See Rachel Kahn Best et al., Multiple Disadvantages: An Empirical Test of 
Intersectionality Theory in EEO Litigation, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 991, 994–97 (2011); 
Emma Reece Denny, Mo’ Claims Mo’ Problems: How Courts Ignore Multiple Claimants 
in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 30 LAW & INEQ. 339, 340 (2012); Mayeri, supra 
note 35 at 714. 
 37. Best et al., supra note 36, at 1013. 
 38. Id. at 991. 
 39. Abrams, supra note 32, at 2503. 
 40. Gowri Ramachandran, Intersectionality As “Catch 22”: Why Identity Performance 
Demands Are Neither Harmless Nor Reasonable, 69 ALB. L. REV. 299, 301 (2006) 
(defining “intersectionals” as “persons who are members of more than one ‘low-status’ 
category, such as women of color, queer persons of color, or indigent women”). 
 41. Best et al., supra note 36, at 991. 
 42. Abrams, supra note 32, at 2494. 
 43. Best et al., supra note 36, at 991. 
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complicated. The most obvious roadblock to remedying intersectional 
discrimination is the way that Congress designed and wrote the 
antidiscrimination statutes. Antidiscrimination law is designed around 
the protection of certain “protected classes.”44 To make out a 
cognizable disparate treatment claim under an antidiscrimination 
statute, a plaintiff must identify her protected class (e.g., race) and 
sub-class (e.g., African American), upon which she believes her 
adverse treatment was based.45 Because of the statutory design, for 
much of civil rights analysis, courts look to similarly-situated 
individuals as a kind of control group to evaluate whether the 
plaintiff’s adverse treatment can be tagged to her protected class 
status.46 The structure of the protected class categorization fails 
intersectional plaintiffs because it sets up false and defeating control 
groups, creates an unnecessary “but for” test for civil rights plaintiffs, 
and is vulnerable to a slippery slope critique. 
A plaintiff alleging that she was not hired in violation of Title 
VII, for example, must prove her case under either the McDonnell 
Douglas test47 or Price Waterhouse analysis.48 To make a prima facie 
case under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff must establish that (1) 
she is a member of a protected class, (2) she applied for and was 
qualified for the job, (3) she was not hired for the job, and (4) the job 
either remained open or was filled with someone from outside her 
protected sub-class.49 Once she makes her prima facie case, the 
burden shifts to the defendant to prove a non-discriminatory reason 
for the adverse treatment.50 Then, the burden shifts back to the 
plaintiff to establish that the defendant’s non-discriminatory reason is 
 
 44. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §	2000e-2 (2012) (prohibiting discrimination in the workplace 
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin); id. §	3604 (prohibiting 
discrimination in housing on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, disability, 
and national origin). 
 45. See Elengold, supra note 2, at 4. Although civil rights plaintiffs may also seek to 
remedy disparate impact discrimination, this paper focuses on disparate, or differential, 
treatment claims. 
 46. See, e.g., Reinhart v. Lincoln Cty., 482 F.3d 1225, 1229 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing 
Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491, 1501 (10th Cir. 1995)) (recognizing that a 
disparate treatment claim under the Fair Housing Act “requires proof of ‘differential 
treatment of similarly situated persons or groups’”); Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 
34, 39 (2d Cir. 2000) (cataloguing cases where courts have analyzed Title VII claims of 
discrimination by assessing whether the employer treated the plaintiff “less favorably than 
a similarly situated employee outside his protected group”). 
 47. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
 48. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244–45 (1989). 
 49. 411 U.S. at 802. 
 50. Id. 
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pretext for discrimination.51 The Price Waterhouse analysis, as 
amended for employment actions by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
permits an employee to demonstrate intentional discrimination where 
her protected class status was a “motivating factor” in the adverse 
employment action, even if other factors also came in to play.52 
Both the McDonnell Douglas test and the Price Waterhouse 
analysis fail intersectional plaintiffs because they silo the protected 
classes, rely on false control group(s), and set up a false “but for” 
analysis. Courts too often cabin claims by protected class. If, for 
example, a plaintiff alleges discrimination based on her status as a 
Black woman, in most cases, the factfinder would be asked to 
consider evidence of race-based discrimination separate and apart 
from sex-based discrimination. Tametra’s case is a clear example. 
Although her complaint alleged race-sex intersectional discrimination 
(i.e., “[t]he working environment at Cricket was replete with sexually-
charged statements and jokes, racially offensive terms, and 
insensitivity toward Plaintiff as an African-American woman”),53 
Tametra pled “Sexual Discrimination under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964” separately from “Racial Discrimination under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”54 The jury instructions 
similarly charged the factfinders to separately assess her race 
discrimination and sex discrimination claims.55 And the jury 
interrogatories clearly established the separate analysis. The jury 
interrogatories asked first whether the plaintiff was sexually 
harassed.56 The jury answered no.57 Then the jury interrogatories 
asked whether the plaintiff was discriminated against because of her 
race.58 Once again, the jury answered no.59 Nowhere was the jury even 
permitted to consider whether Tametra was discriminated against 
 
 51. Id. at 804. 
 52. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244–45 (1989) (developing a “mixed-motive” test 
for employment discrimination under Title VII and holding that once a plaintiff “shows 
that gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid 
a finding of liability only by proving that it would have made the same decision even if it 
had not allowed gender to play such a role” (footnote omitted)); see also Civil Rights Act 
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §	107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §	1981(a) 
(2012)). 
 53. Moore Compl., supra note 1, at 3. 
 54. Id. at 7–9. 
 55. Moore Jury Instructions, supra note 18, at 4, 6. 
 56. Moore Jury Questions, supra note 18, at 1. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 2. 
 59. Id. 
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because she was a Black woman.60 That separation is replicated 
throughout civil rights jurisprudence.61 
In addition to cabining the evidence, the use of protected classes 
to govern analysis of alleged discrimination sets up false comparison 
control groups (“comparators”) to establish that the plaintiff’s 
protected class identity or identities was the basis for the adverse 
employment or housing decision. Other scholars have described this 
phenomenon by identifying and challenging that White men have 
become the comparator group for analyzing discrimination of a Black 
woman.62 This Article views it through a related, but different lens of 
siloed claims and cabined evidence. If a Black woman alleges race-sex 
discrimination, then an employer preferencing a White woman can 
stymie her sex discrimination claim or an employer preferencing a 
Black man can stymie her race discrimination claim. In other words, 
an employer can argue that he does not discriminate against women 
by pointing to the White woman who did not experience adverse 
treatment. He can similarly defeat the plaintiff’s race claim by 
pointing to the Black man who advanced in the company. While other 
theorists have focused on white-ness and male-ness as neutral 
comparators—a critical point in understanding the failures of the 
antidiscrimination doctrine—this Article’s analysis identifies the 
fundamental methodological flaw in using McDonnell Douglas to 
analyze antidiscrimination claims because it explicitly recognizes that 
the siloing of the protected classes limits the chances of an 
intersectional plaintiff’s success on two separate axes. 
 
 60. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 701, 710–14 (2001) (detailing the failures of antidiscrimination statutes for 
intersectional plaintiffs through the use of a complex hypothetical of a Black female 
plaintiff). 
 61. See, e.g., Daniels v. Brooklyn Estates & Props. Realty, 413 F. App’x 399, 402 (2d 
Cir. 2011) (alleging race and disability discrimination); Hall v. Meadowood Ltd. P’ship, 7 
F. App’x 687, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (alleging disability discrimination and sexual 
harassment); Thomas v. Pocono Mtn. Sch. Dist., No. 3:10-CV-1946, 2011 WL 2471532, at 
*7 (M.D. Pa. June 21, 2011) (alleging race and age discrimination and retaliation); 
Harmon v. Mattson, Nos. C8-99-132, Co-99-755, 1999 WL 1057236, at *3–4 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Nov. 23, 1999) (alleging race discrimination and sexual harassment). 
 62. See Denny, supra note 36, at 366 (“Most courts require that a comparator be 
someone who shares none of the protected characteristics of the plaintiff, so that a Black, 
female plaintiff would have to use a non-Black, male comparator to prove pretext.”); see 
also Minna J. Kotkin, Diversity and Discrimination: A Look at Complex Bias, 50 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1439, 1491–92 (2009) (suggesting that claims by Black females have been 
defeated by application of a White male comparator); Zachary A. Kramer, The New Sex 
Discrimination, 63 DUKE L.J. 891, 934–35 (2014) (lamenting that there “was no one who 
could serve as a comparator” for a gender-nonconforming lesbian woman). 
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The separation also sets up a false “but for” analysis. Although 
claims under Title VII should be excluded from a “but for” analysis 
because courts have permitted “mixed motive” or “motivating factor” 
claims under Price Waterhouse,63 factfinders may question the 
plaintiff’s credibility if she asserts multiple rationales for the 
employer’s adverse action. In fact, there is reason to believe that 
factfinders harshly judge the credibility of one asserting multiple 
claims of discrimination because it is seen as throwing everything 
against the wall to see what sticks.64 This distrust of intersectional 
claims is connected to the courts’ concern about an amorphous 
slippery slope in intersectional discrimination claims that threatens to 
overtake the civil rights protections.65 
Although not the same kind of structural barrier as those 
addressed above, it is also important to recognize the differential 
doctrinal treatment for racial harassment and sexual harassment 
claims. A plaintiff alleging sexual harassment has two potential claim 
theories; a plaintiff alleging racial harassment has only one. In a 
sexual harassment claim, a plaintiff may proceed under either or both 
of two theories: quid pro quo or hostile environment.66 Quid pro quo 
generally requires a showing that the perpetrator conditioned a 
benefit or limitation (e.g., housing or employment) on a sexual 
encounter.67 To prove a hostile environment claim, the plaintiff must 
establish that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to 
“alter the conditions of [the victim’s employment or housing] and 
create an abusive .	.	. environment.”68 Although racial harassment is a 
 
 63. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 228 (1989) (finding that a “mixed 
motive” Title VII claim is cognizable). But see Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 
176–77 (2009) (holding that age must be the “but for” cause of discrimination under the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act). Gross has not (yet) been extended to the Fair 
Housing Act. See, e.g., Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. City of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 616 (2d Cir. 
2016). 
 64. Michael Bologna, Judges Warn Employment Lawyers Against Motions for 
Dismissal, Summary Judgment, Empl. Discrimination Rep., BLOOMBERG BNA (Dec. 4, 
2002), http://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/XBN07BG5GVG0 [https://perma.cc
/E4QX-9RV9] (quoting United States District Court Judge Ruben Castillo of the 
Northern District of Illinois’ describing plaintiffs’ lawyers as “throwing a plate of spaghetti 
at the wall to see what sticks”).  
 65. See discussion infra text accompanying note 103. 
 66. See Shellhammer v. Lewallen, 1 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (P-H) ¶15,472, 135, 136 
(W.D. Ohio 1983), aff’d, 770 F.2d 167, 1985 WL 13505 (6th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) 
(unpublished table decision). 
 67. See, e.g., Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1089 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 68. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986); see also Honce, 1 F.3d 
at 1090 (applying the “severe or pervasive” standard to the Fair Housing Act). 
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cognizable claim under traditional civil rights laws,69 a racial 
harassment plaintiff can proceed only under one claim—hostile 
environment. A quid pro quo claim does not translate from sexual 
harassment to racial harassment. A plaintiff alleging racial 
harassment could not, for example, make out a case that the landlord 
charged her less rent because she agreed to put up with racist rants on 
a regular basis.70 Further, the “severe or pervasive” standard is a 
difficult standard to achieve and many racial harassment claims have 
been dismissed for failing to meet the strict standard, making it even 
more difficult to make out a racial harassment claim.71 As a normative 
matter, this differential doctrinal treatment suggests that situating a 
race-sex discrimination claim in sex discrimination opens more 
avenues to success than situating the same claim in race 
discrimination. 
B. Advocacy: The Failure of the Stock Story 
In part because of the doctrinal concerns detailed above, civil 
rights advocates have regularly relied on stock stories to explain 
discrimination in a simplistic, easy-to-understand manner.72 Stock 
stories are narratives that advocates use to tell their clients’ stories, 
often in a courtroom. Stock stories invoke standard tropes, themes, 
and characters that are familiar to the listener and that “resonate with 
 
 69. See, e.g., Woodland v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son, Inc., 302 F.3d 839, 844 (8th Cir. 
2002). 
 70. One could (and probably should) challenge the law’s development of such 
different paths to success for sexual harassment and racial harassment. That, however, is 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
 71. Several courts have found racially offensive conduct to not be sufficiently severe 
or pervasive under Title VII. See, e.g., Woodland, 302 F.3d at 844; Jones v. Dallas Cty., 47 
F. Supp. 3d 469, 484–85 (N.D. Tex. 2014); Romeo v. APS Healthcare Bethesda, Inc., 876 
F. Supp. 2d 577, 594 (D. Md. 2012). The severe or pervasive standard is also difficult under 
a sexual harassment theory. See, e.g., Saxton v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526, 534–35 
(7th Cir. 1993) (affirming lower court’s grant of summary judgment to employer defendant 
and affirming that inappropriate behavior toward a subordinate employee was insufficient 
to rise to the level of severe and pervasive sexual harassment); Weiss v. Coca-Cola 
Bottling Co. of Chi., 990 F.2d 333, 337 (7th Cir. 1993) (affirming lower court’s ruling that 
plaintiff’s allegations that her supervisor asked for dates, called her a “dumb blonde,” 
placed “I love you” signs in her locker, placed his hand on her shoulder, and attempted to 
kiss her were isolated incidents that did not rise to the level of an actionable claim for 
hostile environment).  
 72. Advocates include those lawyers who represent civil rights plaintiffs and those 
activists (lawyers and others) who support civil rights protections through programming 
and policy work. This Article focuses primarily on lawyers representing victims of civil 
rights violations, primarily through litigation. 
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the values, beliefs and assumptions” of the audience.73 By relying on 
familiar themes and characters, stock stories ring true with factfinders 
because they seem consistent with how the factfinder understands the 
world to work and thus appear credible.74 Sometimes, stock stories 
draw on bias or cultural stereotypes to boil a legal claim down to the 
simplest and most universally palatable story.75 Scholars, however, 
have detailed how stock stories are insufficient to remedy certain 
harms, especially those harms that are seemingly too complex.76 
Antidiscrimination advocacy and doctrine have long been 
influenced by stock stories.77 While there may be legitimate, strategic 
reasons to utilize a stock story, including ethical obligations to achieve 
the client’s goals,78 scholars have explored the dangers of stock stories 
in venues like housing discrimination and employment discrimination. 
For example, the “dirty old man” stock story utilized in sexual 
harassment in housing cases is problematic because, by excluding race 
from the story and thus from the judicial analysis, the stock story 
perpetuates the very stereotypes and structural forces that have 
operated throughout American history to ignore and permit 
 
 73. See Muneer I. Ahmad, The Ethics of Narrative, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y 
& L. 117, 122 (2002) (pointing to stock characters like “the heroic firefighter, the Good 
Samaritan” and “pernicious stories” such as “the helpless woman victim, the crack whore, 
the lascivious fag”). 
 74. See DAVID F. CHAVKIN, CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION: A TEXTBOOK FOR LAW 
SCHOOL CLINICAL PROGRAMS 49 (2002). 
 75. See infra text accompanying notes 77–79.  
 76. See, e.g., Leigh Goodmark, When Is a Battered Woman Not a Battered Woman? 
When She Fights Back, 20 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 75, 76–77 (2008) (recognizing harms 
flowing from the stock story of a domestic violence victim); Adele M. Morrison, Changing 
the Domestic Violence (Dis)course: Moving from White Victim to Multi-Cultural Survivor, 
39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1061, 1078 (2006) (critiquing the domestic violence stock story as 
one filtered through the White woman’s lens and contending that adherence to that 
narrative silences women of color and ignores their abuse); see also Elengold, supra note 
21, at 240–42 (critiquing the stock story of sexual harassment in housing as ignoring the 
effect of race on experiences of such harassment). 
 77. See, e.g., Elengold, supra note 21, at 240–42; Gerald Torres, Translation and 
Stories, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1367–68 (2002) (recognizing the benefit and risks of 
stock stories and, using labor organizing as an example, recognizing when stock stories 
must be changed or challenged); Rachel Osterman, Comment, Origins of A Myth: Why 
Courts, Scholars, and the Public Think Title VII’s Ban on Sex Discrimination Was an 
Accident, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 409, 416–24 (2009) (discussing the stock story of the 
insertion of sex into Title VII). 
 78. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) (“A 
lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or 
personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and take whatever lawful and ethical measures are 
required to vindicate a client’s cause or endeavor.”). 
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continued sexual abuse of Black women in the home.79 Dependence 
on stock stories can reinforce, rather than remedy, structural forces 
and inequities that perpetuate discrimination. 
Reliance on a simple stock story is an advocacy choice that 
ignores intersectional discrimination and eliminates the opportunity 
for courts to remedy the complex harm. By relying on simplistic 
tropes or one-dimensional stock characters, advocates do not push 
factfinders to understand or even seek to remedy intersectional 
discrimination. In addition to the fact that stock stories are readily 
available and infused in our cultural consciousness, the way that civil 
rights statutes are built around rigid protected classes also reinforces 
the stock story choice. The doctrinal concerns reflected by the courts’ 
unwillingness to explode the rigid silos of the protected classes is both 
a cause and effect of advocates’ adherence to the simplistic stock 
story. 
C. Agencies: The Failure of the Standard Form 
Agencies have a significant amount of control and influence in 
both individual claims of discrimination and development of 
antidiscrimination doctrine. In Title VII actions, for example, a 
potential plaintiff in a federal lawsuit must first file a charge with the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) before 
suing in federal court.80 In housing discrimination cases, a potential 
plaintiff is not required to exhaust her administrative remedies, but 
the Fair Housing Act provides for inexpensive and relatively efficient 
adjudication through an administrative process at the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) and its state 
corollaries.81 The problem is that the agencies rely on standard forms 
that were developed to track the antidiscrimination statutes; statutes 
that, as described above, provide protection based on rigidly defined 
protected classes. 
 
 79. The “dirty old man” narrative describes an “aberrant bad actor male landlord 
abusing his authority to take advantage sexually of women who, because of economic 
circumstances, have no alternatives.” See Elengold, supra note 21, at 229; see also Regina 
Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 539, 552–54 (analyzing Chambers v. Omaha 
Girls Club, Inc. and concluding that use of the stock story of a well-meaning organization 
exhibiting “sympathy for poor black youngsters and desperation about stemming ‘the 
epidemic’ of teenage pregnancy that plagues them” actually “replicate[s] the very 
economic hardships and social biases that, according to the district court, made the role 
model rule necessary in the first place”). 
 80. 42 U.S.C. §	2000e-5(f)(1) (2012). 
 81. Id. §	3610. 
96 N.C. L. REV. 457 (2018) 
2017] CLUSTERED BIAS 473 
A plaintiff filing a complaint with the EEOC or HUD fills out a 
standard form that is designed to be easy for both the (usually pro se) 
complainant and the agency, which must sift through far too many 
complaints.82 The forms have boxes to check and demographic data to 
set forth.83 The EEOC Intake Questionnaire, for example, is a four-
page form.84 It asks for personal information that includes check 
boxes for race and sex.85 It requests fill-in-the-blank style information 
on the alleged perpetrator of the discrimination, employment data, 
witnesses for the incidents, and prior charges filed.86 It asks “[w]hat is 
the reason (basis) for your claim of employment discrimination” and 
provides ten check-boxes based on legally protected classes.87 Neither 
the form nor the one-page instruction sheet provide any information 
or guidance on how to determine the basis for a complainant’s 
treatment or the consequences of checking certain boxes and not 
others.88 Further, the form provides a one-line fill-in-the-blank style 
question for the complainant to insert information about the 
discriminatory action, inviting the complainant to “attach additional 
pages if needed.”89 Once the complaint is received, agency employees 
determine what kind of claim to charge, a decision upon which 
federal courts heavily rely later in the life of the action.90 In many 
cases, the choices the claimant makes on the form have a preclusive 
 
 82. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., OFFICE OF FAIR HOUSING AND EQUAL 
OPPORTUNITY ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, FY2014–FY2015, at 10 (stating that 
HUD and its Fair Housing Assistance Program grantees investigated nearly 8,500 
complaints in each of fiscal years 2014 and 2015, which are exclusive of those complaints 
investigated by state and regional fair housing entities); U.S. EQUAL EMP’T 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, CHARGE STATISTICS, FY1997–FY2016, https://www1.eeoc.gov
//eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm?renderforprint=1 [https://perma.cc/SL8A-
A3S7] (nearly 90,000 charges filed by individuals at the EEOC in fiscal year 2015). 
 83. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION INTAKE QUESTIONNAIRE, https://egov.eeoc.gov/eas
/uniformintakequestionnaire09.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KGB-4LUG]; U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. 
AND URBAN DEV., DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT HOUSING 
DISCRIMINATION COMPLAINT, https://portal.hud.gov/FHEO903/Form903/Form903Start.action 
[https://perma.cc/KM69-PZDX]. 
 84. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 83. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. The form also notes, “If you feel you were treated worse for several reasons, 
such as your sex, religion[,] and national origin, you should check all that apply.” Id. 
 88. Id. The instruction sheet does offer a website to “find out more information about 
the laws we enforce and our charge-filing procedures.” Id. Nowhere on the website does it 
explain “mixed-motive” discrimination, provide information about multiple claims of 
discrimination, or the preclusive effect of the charge of discrimination. See U.S. EQUAL 
EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov [https://perma.cc/LM87-WMCY]. 
 89. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 83. 
 90. See 42 U.S.C. §	2000e-5(b) (2012). 
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effect; the boxes the complainant checks can be used by the 
defendant as a sword to dismiss alternative claims.91 Because 
complainants are usually pro se at the administrative agency stage,92 
many do not have the legal sophistication to understand the effects of 
their choices. Nor does the form even suggest that there may be 
downstream consequences of checking certain boxes.93 Not only does 
such a system fail individual complex complainants, but because 
courts rely so heavily on the formulaic assessment of discrimination, 
the agency process has a significant influence on the doctrine’s 
development. 
II. SCHOLARSHIP: LIMITS OF INTERSECTIONALITY THEORY AS 
APPLIED TO ANTIDISCRIMINATION DOCTRINE 
Intersectionality is often given as an answer to the failures of 
antidiscrimination law to remedy discrimination for complex 
plaintiffs. In other words, if only advocates, agencies, and courts 
would understand intersectionality, antidiscrimination law might 
respond more adequately to intersectional plaintiffs. But nearly three 
decades after Crenshaw’s path-breaking work, intersectionality 
theory has not gained a strong foothold in civil rights jurisprudence.94 
This Part focuses on two points of disconnect between 
intersectionality theory and antidiscrimination jurisprudence and 
practice that has limited intersectional plaintiffs’ success in the 
courtroom. 
 
 91. See, e.g., Miles v. Dell, Inc., 429 F.3d 480, 491–92 (4th Cir. 2005) (affirming 
dismissal of retaliation claim where the plaintiff “did not check the retaliation box on her 
charge form, and the narrative explaining her charge made no mention of retaliation”); 
Luna v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 54 F. App’x 404, 2002 WL 31687698, at *1 (5th Cir. Oct. 
22, 2002) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision) (stating that because plaintiff “failed 
to mark the box indicating his intention to bring a claim of national origin 
discrimination.	.	.	. [He] failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to that claim”); 
Thomas v. Tex. Dep’t. of Criminal Justice, 220 F.3d 389, 395 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that 
plaintiff could not proceed with a race discrimination claim because her EEOC Charge of 
Discrimination was limited to sex discrimination); Cohens v. Md. Dep’t of Human Res., 
933 F. Supp. 2d 735, 743 (D. Md. 2013) (dismissing retaliation claim where the plaintiff 
“neither checked the ‘retaliation’ box on her EEOC charge nor alleged retaliation in the 
charge’s factual summary”). Although courts should not apply a rigid exclusion of claims 
based solely on the check boxes, the forms have a preclusive effect in practice. See infra 
Section IV.C. 
 92. See What You Can Expect After You File a Charge, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/process.cfm [https://perma.cc
/V27R-GMRJ] (explaining the process of investigation after filing a charge with the 
EEOC). 
 93. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 83. 
 94. See supra notes 32–43 and accompanying text. 
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The first barrier to implementing intersectionality theory in 
antidiscrimination law is the challenge that the theory is under 
inclusive, or reductionist. In other words, intersectionality theory 
simplifies an extremely complex idea (identity and bias associated 
with another’s identity) to the point of distortion.95 Devon W. 
Carbado and Mitu Gulati explore the simplicity and reductionism of 
the “metaphor of intersectionality” by analyzing its application to a 
traditional Venn diagram.96 Traditional notions of intersectional 
identity, as shown on a Venn diagram, are represented by two 
overlapping circles, one representing a disenfranchised sex group 
(e.g., female or female-ness)97 and the other representing a 
disenfranchised racial group (e.g., Black or Black-ness). The overlap 
between the circles represents the identity and experience of the 
















 95. Peter Kwan, Complicity and Complexity: Cosynthesis and Praxis, 49 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 673, 687 (2000). 
 96. Carbado & Gulati, supra note 60, at 705–06. Others have similarly employed a 
Venn diagram to discuss intersectionality. See Arin N. Reeves, Race as a Red Herring? 
The Logical Irrelevance of the Race vs. Class Debate, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 835, 838–40 
(2011) (using the Venn diagram concept to discuss the intersection of race and class 
inequities); Enrique Schaerer, Intragroup Discrimination in the Workplace: The Case for 
“Race Plus,” 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 57, 86 (2010) (using the Venn diagram to discuss 
a “race plus” approach to antidiscrimination law). 
 97. As anthropologists, sociologists, and legal scholars continue to recognize the 
complexity of sex, gender, and gender identity, the circle defined as “sex” must encompass 
more than just “female.” See Franklin H. Romeo, Beyond A Medical Model: Advocating 
for A New Conception of Gender Identity in the Law, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 713, 
719–30 (2005) (assessing the biological and medical models of gender within the law and 
advocating for a model of gender self-determination in the law). 
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Figure 1: In the traditional intersectionality Venn diagram, 
circle A represents a subordinated gender group (e.g., female or 
female-ness) and circle B represents a subordinated racial 
group (e.g., Black or Black-ness). The overlap, represented by 
area 2, denotes the intersection. 
 
Carbado and Gulati explicitly note that the Venn diagram is too 
simplistic and crude of a tool to capture the complexity of Crenshaw’s 
theory of intersectionality,98 but also recognize that the metaphor of 
intersectionality is deep-seated and resilient.99 And intersectionality  
theory’s primary association with women of color provides fuel for 
the critique of under-inclusivity.100 
The second barrier to implementing the theory in practice is the 
challenge that intersectionality theory is over inclusive because it can 
be applied to an infinite number of identity intersections, with no 
logical boundaries.101 Without natural boundaries, critics suggest that 
 
 98. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 60, at 706 (“The diagram suggests that there are 
social moments in which race and gender exist apart from each other as ‘pure’ identities. 
Although the metaphor of intersectionality conveys this idea, the fully theory of 
intersectionality, and certainly Crenshaw’s conceptualization of this theory, rejects it. 
Fundamental to intersectionality theory is the notion that race and gender are 
interconnected; they do not exist as disaggregated identities .	.	.	.”). 
 99. See id. 
 100. Darren Lenard Hutchinson, New Complexity Theories: From Theoretical 
Innovation to Doctrinal Reform, 71 UMKC L. REV. 431, 437 (2002) (“Intersectionality 
theorists typically have failed to make this positional shift, due to their singular focus on 
‘women of color’ and their failure to theorize the universality of complex subordination.”). 
 101. Kwan, supra note 95, at 687 (“[A]s identity categories multiply within any set of 
circumstances, the ability of intersectionality to provide theoretical insights is 
correspondingly compromised.”). 
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intersectionality theory provides no defined group to study or protect. 
Empiricists, for example, assert that it is impossible to theorize about 
or study a group when each person in that group is “composed of a 
complex and unique matrix of identities that shift over time, is never 
fixed, is constantly unstable and forever distinguishable from that of 
everyone else in the universe.”102 Because of the seemingly infinite 
reach of intersectionality, courts have complained that introduction of 
intersectional discrimination into antidiscrimination law causes a 
slippery slope problem. One court, for example, complained that 
introduction of intersectional discrimination would create a “many-
headed Hydra” that antidiscrimination laws cannot contain.103 
The concerns of the under-inclusivity and over-inclusivity of 
intersectionality theory limit the theory’s useful application to 
antidiscrimination doctrine.104 They also operate to blind us from 
understanding how the experiences of one group can be analogous to 
the experiences of another group. The under-inclusive critique 
suggests that intersectionality theory posits that a single group 
(usually Black women) has some undefined unique experience that 
cannot be replicated or understood outside of that group. Similarly, 
the over-inclusive critique of intersectionality reveals the threat of 
infinite intersections overtaking the ability to categorize and thus, 
study and protect. Either one of those lenses then obscures the ability 
to see how one form of intersectional bias (i.e., discrimination against 
a Black female) is analogous to and different from other forms of 
complex bias.105 
Scholars have recognized the disconnect between 
intersectionality theory and civil rights doctrine.106 Further, scholars 
have pushed on the simple metaphor of intersectionality and 
 
 102. Peter Kwan, Jeffrey Dahmer and the Cosynthesis of Categories, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 
1257, 1277 (1997). 
 103. Judge v. Marsh, 649 F. Supp. 770, 780 (D.D.C. 1986). 
 104. I am not sure that intersectionality and post-intersectionality theorists would 
consider the inapplicability of the theory to antidiscrimination doctrine as a limitation of 
the theory itself because many believe that the antidiscrimination doctrine is 
fundamentally flawed and beyond redemption. That is a worthwhile conversation to have, 
but outside the scope of this Article. See infra note 117 and accompanying text. To the 
extent that one wishes to import the lessons of intersectionality theory to 
antidiscrimination doctrine, as this Article aims to do, it is necessary to address the 
critiques of under-inclusivity and over-inclusivity. 
 105. Kwan, supra note 95, at 687 (“[I]ntersectionality’s reductionism does not allow us 
to forge ideological coalitions, political allegiances nor communities of support .	.	.	.”). 
 106. See supra notes 32–43 and accompanying text. 
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reframed the construct through different “post-intersectionality”107 
lenses—identity performance theory,108 multiple consciousness,109 and 
intercategorical comparisons,110 for instance—and with different 
names—identity multiplicity,111 cosynthesis,112 interconnectivity,113 and 
multidimensionality,114 for example.115 Scholars, in fact, have 
expanded the concept of intersectionality to multiple groups and axes 
of identity.116 Intersectionality and post-intersectionality theorists 
have made profound contributions to our understanding of identity 
and bias. And yet there remains a disconnect between the recognition 
of intersectional discrimination and the legal remedy of such 
discrimination.117 
 
 107. Kwan, supra note 95, at 686 (noting that scholars are “moving in the direction of 
post-intersectional theories”). 
 108. Carbado & Gulati, supra note 60, at 701–02. 
 109. Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as 
Jurisprudential Method, 14 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 297, 299 (1992). 
 110. Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Theorizing from Particularity: Perpetrators and 
Intersectional Theory on Domestic Violence, 16 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 531, 563 (2013); 
Leslie McCall, The Complexity of Intersectionality, 30 SIGNS 1771, 1773–74 (2005). 
 111. Devon W. Carbado, Black Rights, Gay Rights, Civil Rights, 47 UCLA L. REV. 
1467, 1518 (2000). 
 112. Kwan, supra note 95, at 673, 687; Kwan, supra note 102, at 1257. 
 113. Francisco Valdes, Sex and Race in Queer Legal Culture: Ruminations on Identities 
& Inter-Connectivities, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 25, 57–66 (1995). 
 114. D. Wendy Greene, A Multidimensional Analysis of What Not to Wear in the 
Workplace: Hijabs and Natural Hair, 8 FIU L. REV. 333, 338–41 (2013); Darren Lenard 
Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: “Intersectionality,” “Multidimensionality,” and the 
Development of an Adequate Theory of Subordination, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 285, 309–11 
(2001) [hereinafter Hutchinson, Identity Crisis]; Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet 
Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory and Political Discourse, 29 
CONN. L. REV. 561, 618 (1997) [hereinafter Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen]. 
 115. Many engaged in post-intersectionality theorizing recognize Kimberlé Crenshaw’s 
own statement that her intersectionality theory is a “provisional concept linking 
contemporary politics with postmodern theory.” Crenshaw, supra note 25, at 1244 n.9. 
 116. See Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol, Latina Multidimensionality and LatCrit 
Possibilities: Culture, Gender, and Sex©, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 811, 812 (1999); Hutchinson, 
Out Yet Unseen, supra note 114, at 563–65; Francisco Valdes, Beyond Sexual Orientation 
in Queer Legal Theory: Majoritarianism, Multidimensionality, and Responsibility in Social 
Justice Scholarship or Legal Scholars As Cultural Warriors, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1409, 
1420 (1998). 
 117. Perhaps the reason for the disconnect in scholarship stems from intersectionality 
theory’s position within the critical race theory movement. Critical race theory is “a 
collection of critical stances against the existing legal order from a race-based point of 
view.” Roy L. Brooks, Critical Race Theory: A Proposed Structure and Application to 
Federal Pleading, 11 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 85, 85 (1994). Several critical race theorists 
have rejected the current antidiscrimination doctrine as a tool to deal with intersectional 
identity and discrimination. See Crenshaw, supra note 26, at 1334 (recognizing that some 
Critical Legal Studies scholars absolutely reject the notion that rights-based approaches to 
civil rights are compatible with institutional social change). Other race crits have gone 
even further, questioning whether rights-based antidiscrimination law is a worthwhile tool 
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This Article recognizes the critically important insights that 
intersectionality and post-intersectionality theorists have developed 
over the past thirty years. Such theories and theorists have exposed 
the failures of feminist and antiracist movements in erasing the 
experiences of people with intersectional identities, including Black 
women. Thoughtful scholars have explained how race, sex, and other 
personal identity traits cannot legitimately be disentangled from one 
another.118 Critical race scholars have explored the many ways in 
which social and cultural privilege is embedded in the White male 
heteronormative experience.119 And critical scholars’ hesitancy to 
embrace the rights-based antidiscrimination law structure reveals 
compelling concerns with the current statutory scheme.120 This Article 
recognizes and is shaped by those insights. It borrows those insights to 
push on antidiscrimination laws and lawyering to shift to a more 
inclusive, rather than the currently exclusive, approach to assessing 
discrimination in housing, employment, public accommodations, and 
more. To do that, Part III introduces a brand-new framework—the 
cluster framework—as a bridge between the theory and practice, to 
both address intersectional discrimination in antidiscrimination 
doctrine and to utilize analogies between and across subgroup 
discrimination.121 
III. INTRODUCING THE CLUSTER FRAMEWORK 
This Article draws on the insights and critiques of 
intersectionality theory to propose a new framework for pleading, 
litigating, and analyzing intersectional claims of discrimination within 
the antidiscrimination doctrine. The new framework, which this 
Article calls the “cluster framework,” diverges from intersectionality 
and post-intersectionality theories by centering itself within the 
current antidiscrimination doctrine. The cluster framework involves 
(1) reimagining intersectional discrimination through an image of 
 
in pursuing the fight for racial justice. See, e.g., Caldwell, supra note 26, at 95–96. While 
this Article does not ignore the clear drawbacks and failures of antidiscrimination law, it 
seeks to use the legal tools that we currently have to their fullest scope and strength. See 
Crenshaw, supra note 26, at 1356–58 (recognizing both the transformative power of 
antidiscrimination law and the dangers of the rights-based approach in legitimizing a 
structure that has traditionally subordinated Blacks). 
 118. See, e.g., Hutchinson, Identity Crisis, supra note 114, at 309–10. 
 119. See, e.g., Valdes, supra note 116, at 1415–16, 1416 n.24. 
 120. See Caldwell, supra note 26, at 95–96; Crenshaw, supra note 26, at 1334. 
 121. Such an approach certainly does not go as far as many may desire, but absent 
radical change to the doctrine, it does provide a theory and concrete steps for incremental 
change to the current system. 
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coterminous, rather than overlapping, circles of identity; (2) 
relocating intersectional discrimination within those coterminous 
circles and thus, squarely within the definition of any one of the 
relevant protected classes; (3) explicitly defining discrimination to 
include the categorizing, stereotyping, and subjugation of certain 
subgroups of the protected class, thus accounting for the relationship 
between individual discrimination and structural inequities; and (4) 
recognizing the full range of harms that flow from complex 
discrimination—to the individual, her community, her subgroup and 
her group. Such a framework addresses the critiques of 
intersectionality theory in a civil rights action, allowing for analogies 
to, and coalitions with, other subgroups experiencing discrimination. 
For ease of understanding, this Part will use race-sex discrimination as 
the lens to describe the cluster framework more specifically. 
A. Reimagining the Venn Diagram 
Return to the Venn diagram of the prevailing metaphor of 
intersectionality, which imagines one circle symbolizing a subjugated 
racial group (e.g., Black or Black-ness) overlapped, in some part, by a 
circle symbolizing a subjugated sex group (e.g., female or female-
ness).122 This Article reimagines the Venn diagram. Similar to the 
theories of “cosynthesis”123 and “multidimensionality,”124 the circles of 
the revised Venn diagram are layered on top of one another. Under 
the cluster framework, however, the circles are not defined by a 
subjugated group; the circles represent the traditionally protected 
classes in antidiscrimination law. 
If considering race-sex discrimination, for example, one might 
draw a circle representing sex, not female sex or female-ness. That 
circle encompasses one axis of a graph, represented in the graphic 
below by horizontal lines. The lines within the circle represent the 
sex-gender continuum, as externally identified, from male-ness to 
female-ness.125 The continuum is understood from an external (rather 
 
 122. See supra text accompanying notes 96–99. 
 123. See Kwan, supra note 102, at 1280–81 (theorizing that categorization—the ways 
that we identify ourselves and identify others—are multi-layered and not static, such that 
they create prisms that “multipl[y] the boundaries between categories”). 
 124. See, e.g., Hutchinson, Identity Crisis, supra note 114, at 309 (theorizing that 
systems of oppression are inherently complex, such that they account for multiple axes of 
oppression—“racism, heterosexism, patriarchy, and class oppression,” for example—none 
of which can be disentangled from the social identity categories “around which social 
power and disempowerment are distributed”). 
 125. See MARTINE ROTHBLATT, THE APARTHEID OF SEX: A MANIFESTO ON THE 
FREEDOM OF GENDER 13 (1995) (proposing a continuum of sex “along a broad 
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than internal) perspective because the bias underlying discrimination 
claims is external, from the perspective of the perpetrator. The 
continuum lens is particularly useful because a critical part of sex 
discrimination jurisprudence involves a perpetrator discriminating 
against a victim who does not comport with the stereotypes or social 
constructions of gender, which sit along a continuum.126 Then, 
because all persons, regardless of sex, are identified with race,127 one 
might draw another circle coterminous with the first. The second 
circle represents race and encompasses another axis of a graph, 
represented by vertical lines. Like the sex circle, the race circle is also 
a continuum. Understanding that race is socially constructed,128 we 
must also recognize that race is assigned, often based on “phenotype, 
skin color, and eye/hair/other physiological aspects that often define[] 
Blacks in the United States.”129 Taking discrimination against an 
African American, for example, the continuum would gradate from 
white-ness to black-ness, based on those visual cues of race.130 As with 
 
continuum of possibilities”). That is not to say that the antidiscrimination law recognizes a 
gender continuum; the very thrust of this paper is that the protected class categories are 
rigid and distinct. Further, there is a distinction between sex and gender, which must be 
acknowledged. The continuum, however, conflates the two. It does so consciously. The 
language of the antidiscrimination statutes use the term “sex,” so they prohibit “sex 
discrimination.” The courts, however, have recognized sex stereotyping and gender 
stereotyping to create cognizable claims of sex discrimination. See infra note 126. Because 
the cluster framework theory is only useful when applied to the state of the law as it exists, 
it is necessary to understand the continuum this way. 
 126. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 257–58 (1989) (finding that 
plaintiff’s allegation that she faced adverse employment consequences because she was 
overly aggressive and did not act or present as feminine enough was cognizable as a sex 
discrimination claim under Title VII); Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F.3d 195, 
200–01 (2d Cir. 2017) (recognizing a gender stereotyping claim under Title VII’s 
prohibition against sex discrimination); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 
2004) (finding that plaintiff sufficiently pleaded claims of sex stereotyping and gender 
discrimination under Title VII). 
 127. There is strong evidence that race is socially, not biologically constructed. See, e.g., 
EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d 1018, 1026–28 (11th Cir. 2016) (recognizing 
that the EEOC, certain courts, and the dictionary have determined that race is recognized 
as a social, rather than biological, construct); Ho ex rel. Ho v. San Francisco Unified Sch. 
Dist., 147 F.3d 854, 863 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating “[t]hat race is a social construct”). That 
fact, however, does not change the analysis for purposes of the law. Under the law, race is 
an identifiable trait and one that is protected under both the Constitution and civil rights 
laws. See Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d at 1028 (“But our possible current reality does 
not tell us what the country’s collective zeitgeist was when Congress enacted Title VII half 
a century ago.”). 
 128. See supra note 127. 
 129. Salvador Vidal-Ortiz, People of Color, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RACE, ETHNICITY, 
& SOCIETY 1037 (Richard T. Schaefer ed., 2008). 
 130. It is worth recognizing here that this Part consciously conflates the protected 
classes of race and color. The relationship between those categories is complicated and has 
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the sex-gender continuum, the race continuum is understood from an 
external (rather than internal) perspective because the bias 
underlying discrimination claims is external. Those coterminous 
circles could be replicated for any number of protected characteristics 















Figure 2: Under the cluster framework, there are two 
coterminous circles. One circle, marked with vertical lines, 
represents race. The other circle, marked with horizontal lines, 
represents sex. The overlap between the two is complete. Each 
dot in the coterminous circles represents an individual 




led to scholarly debates. See supra note 23. While it might muddy the waters to conflate 
the two protected classes, the fact of the matter is that race is generally identified by the 
color of one’s skin and other racially-ascribed physical traits. It is also true that there is a 
recognized relationship between the shade of skin tone and bias or discrimination. See 
Cynthia E. Nance, Colorable Claims: The Continuing Significance of Color Under Title VII 
Forty Years After Its Passage, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 435, 445–59 (2005) (citing a 
number of studies evidencing the relationship between a darker skin tone and adverse 
reactions). 
 131. This Article limits the application of the cluster framework to the currently-
identified protected classes in the various civil rights laws. Because the goal of this Article 
is to consider how scholars and advocates may use the current antidiscrimination tools to 
more adequately remedy intersectional discrimination, it is natural to begin the analysis 
within the bounds of the current laws. That is not to say, however, that the current 
protected classes are correct or sufficient. Changing or adding to the protected classes, 
however, is outside the scope of this Article. 
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Once the coterminous circles are drawn, one can imagine tiny 
dots representing individual intersectional identities. Each person is 
represented by a dot in the coterminous circles, representing the 
intersection of his/her individual race and sex. As dots fill in the 
larger circles, multi-dimensional clusters will develop symbolizing 
groups of individuals with similar identities along the continuums. For 
example, a cluster will develop that represents Black women. 
The concept of coterminous circles more explicitly recognizes the 
inextricable nature of categories or statuses of identity and bias.132 
And pulling the circles back to represent the entire protected class 
(e.g., sex), rather than limiting the circle to subordinated subgroup of 
the class (e.g., female), does work toward answering the critiques of 
intersectionality theory as applied to civil rights jurisprudence in two 
specific ways. First, it explicitly recognizes that every individual is 
intersectional and that those intersections cross innumerable axes to 
create individuals who experience life and bias in individual ways. 
Second, it provides a plane on which we can begin to see the 
connections between subgroups, rather than utilizing a unique Venn 
diagram for each intersection. The sections below will further draw 
out those benefits. 
B. Connecting the Venn Diagram to Structural Inequities 
The recast Venn diagram, by itself, will likely suffer the same 
critiques as the traditional intersectionality Venn diagram when 
applied in civil rights jurisprudence. For courts, it does not provide an 
explanation for why certain subgroups should be protected under the 
antidiscrimination statutes. In other words, it does not answer the 
“many-headed Hydra” concern.133 For that reason, the cluster 
framework adds an additional dimension—that of structural 
inequities. It is the relationship between certain subgroups (clusters of 
individuals) and the structural inequities suffered by that cluster that 
explain why certain subgroups should be studied and protected as a 
group, even if their individual experiences are not identical. 
What are structural inequities? For purposes of this Article, 
structural inequities are based not on individual actions or biases, but 
arise from the social, cultural, and legal systems that were built on 
and perpetuate unfair, discriminatory, or disproportionate results for 
 
 132. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 60, at 705–06; Hutchinson, Identity Crisis, supra 
note 114, at 309–10; Kwan, supra note 102, at 1277. 
 133. See Judge v. Marsh, 649 F. Supp. 770, 780 (D.D.C. 1986). For the same reasons, it 
also fails to answer theorists’ and empiricists’ questions about why certain subgroups or 
intersectional groups should be studied. 
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certain subgroups.134 While there are innumerable inequities in our 
society, to provide a concrete explanation, this Article identifies three 
that prominently and adversely affect women of color, particularly 
Black women. One is the effect of laws that have operated to Black 
women’s detriment. For example, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the 
National Labor Relations Act, the National Industrial Recovery Act, 
and the Agricultural Adjustment Act—the major New Deal welfare 
programs—explicitly or implicitly excluded African Americans.135 
Although legal protections were later extended, vestiges of the 
exclusion remain deeply ingrained in our legal psyche and culture.136 
Exclusionary laws and policies exacerbate the second structural 
inequity, which is intergenerational wealth disparity.137 In America 
 
 134. See Elengold, supra note 21, at 232 (arguing that adoption of a standard narrative 
about sexual harassment in housing “disregards the way that [structural] factors have 
operated throughout American history to institutionalize the disempowerment of Black 
women, especially in the domestic sphere”); Cassandra Jones Havard, Democratizing 
Credit: Examining the Structural Inequities of Subprime Lending, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 
233, 240 (2006) (including the decades-long disinvestment in urban cities and the “role of 
law in configuring relations of power and in marginalization of class structures” in 
assessment of the structural inequities underlying economic subordination). 
 135. Risa L. Goluboff, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Lost Origins of Civil Rights, 
50 DUKE L.J. 1609, 1678 (2001) (“[A] political compromise Franklin Roosevelt had made 
with southern Dixiecrats left agricultural and domestic workers—the two occupational 
categories to which most African Americans in the South belonged—without redress in 
the New Deal labor legislation. They were excluded from the benefits of the National 
Labor Relations Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and other labor and social welfare 
legislation. Despite its basis in the Commerce Clause and its aspirations for 
comprehensive regulation and labor market unity, the New Deal’s nationalizing project 
was, therefore, only partial.”); William M. Wiecek, Structural Racism and the Law in 
America Today: An Introduction, 100 KY. L.J. 1, 4 (2012) (“Take the original exclusion of 
agricultural and domestic workers from eligibility for Social Security benefits in 1935. 
Because they could not collect old-age or unemployment benefits, field hands, 
sharecroppers, maids, and nannies—constituting the bulk of the black labor force in the 
New Deal South—were shut out from even the most modest opportunity that whites 
enjoyed for wealth accumulation and survival assistance in economic downturns. In this 
example, blacks were not explicitly excluded, but the proxy phrase ‘agricultural and 
domestic workers’ did the job effectively. Nor was this anomalous: African Americans 
were excluded implicitly or through administrative fiat from all major New Deal welfare 
programs, including the National Labor Relations Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the 
National Industrial Recovery Act, and the Agricultural Adjustment Act.”). 
 136. Cf. Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Rape as a Badge of Slavery: The Legal History of, And 
Remedies for, Prosecutorial Race-of-Victim Charging Disparities, 7 NEV. L.J. 1, 43 (2006) 
(recognizing that “[t]he influence of slavery and racism on criminal prosecutions and 
punishments cannot be overemphasized” and noting that “the centuries-long history of 
disparate treatment of Black rape victims continues today”). 
 137. See generally RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN 
HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017) (exposing how 
the legacy of de jure structural segregation at all levels of government created and 
promoted wide-spread neighborhood racial segregation that persists today); Andrea 
Freeman, Racism in the Credit Card Industry, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1071, 1081 (2017) (“The 
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today, Black women experience poverty at nearly double the rate of 
White women, are more than twice as likely to live in inadequate 
housing, and “have less education and higher rates of 
underemployment, poverty, disease, and isolation than white 
women.”138 The wealth gap is generational: it is rooted in the history 
of the long-standing racial hierarchy in America,139 and its effects will 
snowball into the future.140 Finally, the third structural inequity is the 
existence of cultural stereotypes that create particularized 
vulnerability to certain kinds of discrimination and harassment. Black 
women, for example, are habitually subjected to three primary myths 
or stereotypes—Mammy, Jezebel, and Sapphire141—which make them 
vulnerable to sex discrimination and sexual harassment. The Mammy 
image, born in the post-slavery South, is characterized as an asexual, 
obese, dark-skinned, subordinate domestic worker “with large breasts 
and a broad grin.”142 The Jezebel myth describes Black women as 
sexually insatiable and promiscuous.143 Finally, the Sapphire 
stereotype, stoked by Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s 1965 widely-
circulated report on “The Negro Family: The Case for National 
Action,”144 is characterized as outspoken, tenacious, emasculating, 
loud, brash, nagging, and acting outside her proper role in society.145 
 
20:1 wealth gap between Blacks and Whites in the United States is not a manifestation of 
cultural or individual differences, but the product of a long history of discriminatory laws 
and policies that inscribed racial disparities into society.” (footnote omitted)). 
 138. MELISSA V. HARRIS-PERRY, SISTER CITIZEN: SHAME, STEREOTYPES, AND 
BLACK WOMEN IN AMERICA 46 (2011). 
 139. Id. at 206. 
 140. See, e.g., Paul Kiel and Annie Waldman, The Color of Debt: How Collection Suits 
Squeeze Black Neighborhoods, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.propublica.org
/article/debt-collection-lawsuits-squeeze-black-neighborhoods [https://perma.cc/5WCG-
2FZ6] (investigating the way that the inter-generational wealth gap between Black and 
White communities leads to increased debt in Black communities and a further increase in 
the wealth gap across generations). 
 141. HARRIS-PERRY, supra note 138, at 33 (“Mammy, Jezebel, and Sapphire are 
common and painful characterizations of black women and .	.	. each has a long history in 
American social and cultural life.”). 
 142. Carolyn M. West, Violence, in 3 BLACK WOMEN IN AMERICA 281 (Darlene Clark 
Hine ed., 2d ed. 2005). 
 143. See HARRIS-PERRY, supra note 138, at 54–68; Austin, supra note 79, at 570; 
Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of Motherhood, 1 AM. U. J. 
GENDER & L. 1, 11–12 (1993). 
 144. OFF. OF POL’Y PLAN. & RES., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE 
CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION 9–14 (1965), https://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/history
/webid-meynihan.htm [https://perma.cc/L2HP-PFQW]. 
 145. See Melissa N. Stein, Race as a Social Construction, in 3 BLACK WOMEN IN 
AMERICA 1, 8 (Darlene Clark Hine ed., 2d ed. 2005) (“Sapphire is represented as less than 
a woman, and thus undeserving of the protections afforded to proper ladies, yet not a man, 
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Those stereotypes operate to explain and permit sexual abuse and sex 
discrimination of Black women.146 
Considering the relationship between complex identity, complex 
bias, and structural inequities is one answer to the related critiques 
(reductionism and infiniteness) of intersectionality theory as applied 
to the civil rights rubric. Imagine, once again, the race-sex Venn 
diagram, reconstructed under a cluster framework. For purposes of 
civil rights doctrine, it offers courts an explanation of why protecting 
certain subgroups will not overrun the antidiscrimination statutes or 
Congress’ intent in enacting them because it limits protection to the 
loci of clusters. For purposes of advocacy, it offers a lens through 
which to explain to the factfinder why comparator groups must be 
thoughtfully construed. For example, in a case of discrimination 
against a Black female, one might argue that a comparator should be 
any non-Black person or any male. That is because if a Black female 
is fired for being a Black female, she should be able to point to 
anyone who is not a Black female as a comparator. And, although it is 
outside the scope of this Article, it offers a potential framework for a 
legislature to consider why certain subgroups currently unprotected 
under civil rights statutes should, perhaps, gain protection. 
Imagine, also, a cluster of individuals representing Black women. 
Imagine further that, by expanding the coterminous circles beyond 
race and sex, we could place a handful of dots in our diagram 
representing upper-class lesbian White veterinarians from Indiana. 
Intersectionality has failed to take hold in civil rights legislation and 
doctrine in part because of the failure to explain why civil rights laws 
should specifically protect Black women and not upper-class lesbian 
 
despite her masculine persona, affording her none of the rights associated with (white) 
manhood.”). 
 146. Different stereotypes, biases, and cultural tropes are applied to different 
subgroups of women. For example, the “separate spheres” ideology, which has been a 
mainstay of feminist thought, more aptly and appropriately defines the stereotyping that 
White women face in our culture. See Crenshaw, supra note 22, at 154–56; see also Sumi K. 
Cho, Converging Stereotypes in Racialized Sexual Harassment: Where the Model Minority 
Meets Suzie Wong, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 177, 181 (1997) (discussing “how 
converging racial and gender stereotypes of [Asian Pacific American] women help 
constitute what I refer to as ‘racialized (hetero)sexual harassment’”). It is useful to think 
of the different stereotypes and other structural inequities that are applied to different 
groups of women to truly recognize the different burdens that different subgroups of 
women have borne throughout our society. See Crenshaw, supra note 22, at 155 
(“Feminists have attempted to expose and dismantle separate spheres ideology by 
identifying and criticizing the stereotypes that traditionally have justified the disparate 
societal roles assigned to men and women. Yet this attempt to debunk ideological 
justifications for women’s subordination offers little insight into the domination of Black 
women.” (citation omitted)). 
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White veterinarians from Indiana. The answer lies in the structural 
inequities that make Black women particularly vulnerable to 
discrimination and therefore, an appropriate subgroup to study and 
protect.147 When considering the individuals who identify as upper-
class lesbian White veterinarians from Indiana, that group of 
individuals suffers no structural inequities unique to the group.148 The 
cluster framework preserves the ability to recognize structural 
inequities as applied to varied groups of individuals beyond Black 
women while at the same time recognizing a break in the slippery 
slope.149 
C. Relocating Complex Race-Sex Discrimination in 
Antidiscrimination Law 
With an eye toward avoiding the pitfalls of pleading multiple 
claims of discrimination,150 the cluster framework is best situated 
wholly within a singular protected class. For race-sex discrimination, 
this Article suggests conceptualizing the intersectional discrimination 
as sex discrimination. Recognizing the mistreatment of subgroups of 
women as sex discrimination is not new to feminist advocacy. Rather, 
it draws on a feminist framework that defines sex discrimination to 
include the categorization,151 stereotyping, and subjugation of certain 
subgroups of women. 
 
 147. See Roy L. Brooks & Mary Jo Newborn, Critical Race Theory and Classical-
Liberal Civil Rights Scholarship: A Distinction Without A Difference?, 82 CAL. L. REV. 
787, 832 (1994) (“Intersectionality posits that African American women share unique life 
experiences that differ from those of either African American men or white women.”); 
Crenshaw, supra note 22, at 152–60 (recognizing that feminist theory has ignored the 
unique combination of race and gender issues faced by African American women). 
 148. That is not to say that a woman who falls into this identity category cannot seek 
protection under antidiscrimination law, even when applying the cluster framework. She 
may, for example, seek a remedy for sex discrimination because of bias she experienced as 
a lesbian. See Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. College, 853 F.3d 339, 346–47 (7th Cir. 2017) (en 
banc) (recognizing sexual orientation as a subset of sex discrimination under Title VII). 
The point of this example is to say that Title VII does not offer protection for her 
membership in a group of upper-class lesbian White veterinarians from Indiana under the 
cluster framework. 
 149. The cluster framework operates within and subscribes to the traditional 
group/subgroup analysis of Title VII and other antidiscrimination statutes. Not all scholars 
agree that such a framework is appropriate to remedying race and/or sex discrimination. 
See supra text accompanying notes 106–17. See generally Kramer, supra note 62 (arguing 
that the traditional group-based approach to identifying and remedying sex discrimination 
does not account for modern sex discrimination and proposing a model adopting a 
reasonable accommodation framework). 
 150. See supra text accompanying notes 32–43.  
 151. Categorization, by itself, is not necessarily problematic; it is a necessary way that 
we make sense of the complicated world around us. ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & 
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Throughout our nation’s history, women have been separated 
and categorized. Women are married or unmarried. Women are 
childless or mothers. Women work inside the home or outside the 
home. And those categories of women have faced different 
challenges, different biases, and different experiences. And yet, each 
of those categories of women has been the subject of feminist 
scholarship and advocacy. In the Seneca Falls Declaration of 
Sentiments, the drafters spoke of the rights of women who, when 
married, were stripped of civil legal rights and subjected to abuse by 
their husbands,152 as well as the rights of women who were members 
of the church but who were excluded from the ministry.153 In those 
passages, one can see the seeds of defining sexism to include 
circumstances where women—based on their identities, choices, and 
circumstances—are categorized, stereotyped, and subjugated. 
Nineteenth century feminists Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. 
Anthony similarly critiqued marriage as connected to concerns about 
domestic violence, marital rape, and forced pregnancy, even though 
not all women were married and not all married women experienced 
domestic violence.154 Second-wave feminists took up different torches, 
sown from the same seeds of thought. Aileen Clarke Hernandez, then 
president of the National Organization for Women (“NOW”), 
declared lesbian rights to be women’s rights.155 Although not all 
women are lesbians, Hernandez recognized that the categorization 
 
JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 21–26 (2000) (identifying the critical functions of 
categorizing: maximizing mental economy, achieving pragmatic utility, providing reference 
group relevance, a sense of communal power, and personal gratification, and regulating 
risk). Categorization is derived from our society and culture. Id. at 27 (“For the most part, 
our categories do not derive from the shape of the world but create it.	.	.	. [M]ost of our 
category systems are inherited not from our genetic makeup but from our culture .	.	.	.”). 
Where category systems are “used hegemonically, as instruments of power,” however, 
especially when derived from race-based and sex-based stereotyping, categorization 
carries great risk. Id. at 24. 
 152. DECLARATION OF SENTIMENTS, SENECA FALLS (July 19, 1848), reprinted in 
FEMINISM: THE ESSENTIAL HISTORICAL WRITINGS 76, 76–77 (Miriam Schneir ed., 1972) 
(“He has made her, if married, in the eye of the law, civilly dead.	.	.	. In the covenant of 
marriage, she is compelled to promise obedience to her husband, he becoming, to all 
intents and purposes, her master—the law giving him power to deprive her of her liberty, 
and to administer chastisement.”). 
 153. Id. (“He allows her in Church as well as State, but a subordinate position, claiming 
Apostolic authority for her exclusion from the ministry, and, with some exceptions, from 
any participation in the affairs of the Church.”). 
 154. Lucinda N. Finley, Putting “Protection” Back in the Equal Protection Clause: 
Lessons from Nineteenth Century Women’s Rights Activists’ Understandings of Equality, 13 
TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 429, 446 (2004). 
 155. See SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 46 (2011). 
96 N.C. L. REV. 457 (2018) 
2017] CLUSTERED BIAS 489 
and mistreatment of certain groups of women was an issue for all 
women to take up, supporting a NOW resolution to that effect. 
Second-wave feminists applied a similar analysis to pregnancy, 
asserting that the stereotyping and mistreatment of pregnant women 
is sex discrimination that constrains all women.156 Third-wave 
feminists have applied the same concepts to identify transgendered 
persons’ rights157 and rights for women in the military,158 deeming 
rights for those subgroups to be women’s rights. Each has been the 
subject of advocacy around legal rights. And each has stood as 
representative of the female experience such that subjugation related 
to their particular grouping has been deemed a “women’s issue” or a 
“women’s rights issue.” 
The same theory should be applied to Black women as a 
subgroup of women. The discrimination against Black women is sex 
discrimination. Situating race-sex intersectional discrimination wholly 
within the sex discrimination framework, however, is subject to the 
same critiques that gave rise to intersectionality theory in the first 
place—claims that Black women should not have to subordinate their 
race to their gender and claims that advocacy regarding sex 
discrimination has focused on White women and their particular 
needs. That is why this Article puts the client’s voice at the center of 
any antidiscrimination claim.159 Through client-centered lawyering 
and thoughtful narrative, the cluster framework can draw on the 
feminist history of protecting subgroups of women without losing 
sight of the unique experiences of Black women. 
The purpose of situating race-sex discrimination wholly in sex 
discrimination is two-fold. First, because intersectional claims are 
statistically less successful,160 claims situated wholly within a single 
protected class have better chances of success.161 Second, framing 
 
 156. See id. at 63–69. 
 157. See Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The 
Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1995); Demoya R. Gordon, 
Transgender Legal Advocacy: What Do Feminist Legal Theories Have to Offer?, 97 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1719, 1754–61 (2009). 
 158. See Jamie R. Abrams, Debunking the Myth of Universal Male Privilege, 49 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 303, 325–31 (2016); Diane H. Mazur, A Call to Arms, 22 HARV. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 39, 43 (1999). 
 159. See infra Section IV.B. 
 160. See supra text accompanying notes 32–43. 
 161. One could argue for relocating race-sex discrimination wholly in race 
discrimination. Because of the groundwork laid by earlier feminists about subgroup 
discrimination, see supra text accompanying notes 152–58, and because of the differential 
doctrinal treatment of racial harassment and sexual harassment, see supra text 
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race-sex discrimination within sex discrimination allows us to see how 
race-sex discrimination is similar to (and different from) other forms 
of sex discrimination. It responds to the critique of intersectionality 
theory that race-sex intersection (primarily with respect to Black 
women) is a unique kind of discrimination that cannot be analogized 
to other forms of complex discrimination. And, by relocating the 
analysis wholly inside of sex discrimination, it allows us to draw 
parallels to other moments in feminist advocacy where the 
categorization, stereotyping, and subjugation of particular subgroups 
of women has been identified as sex discrimination.162 Redrawing the 
Venn diagram and relocating intersectional discrimination within 
traditional protected classes provides a plane on which we can see the 
connections between the experiences of subgroups, rather than 
treating each subgroup as separate and distinct. 
This is not to say, of course, that the experience of discrimination 
against a woman who works outside the home is the same as 
discrimination against a Black woman. The insights of 
intersectionality theory clearly teach us that they are vastly 
different.163 In fact, this Article may well draw criticism from critical 
race scholars and others concerned that it might, like feminist 
proposals before it, operate to erase Black women’s experiences. That 
is not the intent of this Article; the intent, rather, is to push on the 
current doctrine to become more, rather than less, inclusive. This 
Article recognizes, however, that intent is not always what carries the 
day. It also recognizes that there is a political and cultural cost for 
those with intersectional identities, including Black women, to fit 
their identities and experiences into a framework that was neither 
built nor developed to consider, respect, or accommodate complex 
identity and experience. The proposed framework, however, is an 
effort to bridge the divide between intersectionality theory and 
antidiscrimination law. And the concrete proposals set forth in Part 
IV are designed to elevate, rather than erase, the stories and 
experiences of complex victims of discrimination. For some critics, the 
proposals will not go far enough or answer the critiques applied to 
White feminism. In the absence of a new statutory design for 
redressing discrimination through the law, however, a framework that 
allows us to identify analogous subgroups and potential coalitions will 
 
accompanying notes 66–71, this Article suggests that the sex discrimination lens enjoys a 
greater chance of success. 
 162. In fact, women of color were at the helm of some of the most important 
expansions of the definition of sex discrimination. See Mayeri, supra note 35, at 722–23.  
 163. See supra notes 22–26 and accompanying text; infra notes 184–87. 
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open up tools, strategies, and developed law to fight complex 
violations of civil rights. 
D. Recognizing Direct and Indirect Harms Under a Cluster 
Framework 
The cluster framework also recognizes that categorizing, 
stereotyping, and subjugating subgroups of women harms the 
individual woman, her community, her subgroup, and all women. Just 
as the Venn diagram provides a visual of the relationship between 
individuals, clusters, and the whole, this Article suggests that the 
harm of race-sex discrimination begins with the individual victim and 
then emanates to her community, her subgroup, and the entire group. 
In other words, when a Black woman is the victim of discrimination, 
she is injured, her community (i.e., family, neighborhood) is injured, 
her subgroup (Black women) is injured, and the entire group 
(women) is injured. 
Complex race-sex discrimination clearly harms the individual 
victim. Courts recognize that a victim of discrimination may seek 
damages for actual, economic, or out-of-pocket costs164 and also for 
the embarrassment, humiliation, and shame experienced due to the 
defendant’s discriminatory conduct.165 Discrimination against a Black 
woman also injures her community, including her family, immediate 
friends, and neighbors. If discrimination causes loss of employment or 
housing, for example, she may fall into debt that will have long-lasting 
generational effects on her children and grandchildren.166 Or it may 
 
 164. See, e.g., Rivera v. Inc. Vill. of Farmingdale, 29 F. Supp. 3d 121, 134 (E.D.N.Y. 
2013). 
 165. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 
extended compensatory damages to plaintiffs establishing intentional discrimination under 
Title VII. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §	102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §	1981a (2012)); Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 
111-2, §	3, 123 Stat. 5, 6 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §	2000e-5(e)(3)(B) (2012)); see also Lilly 
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, §	2, 123 Stat. at 5 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §	2000e-5 note). The 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the 1978 amendments to the Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973 similarly allow plaintiffs to recover compensatory damages. Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, §	107(a), 104 Stat. 327, 336 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. §	12117 (2012)); Amendments to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 95-
602, sec.	120, §	505, 92 Stat. 2955, 2982–83 (1978) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §	794a 
(2012)). This Article concentrates on compensatory, rather than punitive damages. For 
thorough analysis of punitive damages under the Fair Housing Act, see generally Timothy 
J. Moran, Punitive Damages in Fair Housing Litigation: Ending Unwise Restrictions on a 
Necessary Remedy, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 279 (2001). 
 166. See M. William Sermons, America’s Household Balance Sheet: The State of 
Lending in America & its Impact on U.S. Households, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING 6 
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decrease her ability to pay for food, which has long-term 
consequences for children’s education and learning, a key component 
in overcoming intergenerational poverty.167 Injury also flows beyond 
the victim’s immediate family. In lead poisoning cases, for example, 
defendant housing authorities and landlords often know that victims 
of lead poisoning are disproportionately young, poor, typically 
African American or Hispanic children, to whom juries will award 
lower damages based on lifetime earnings potential tables.168 
Therefore, “there is less incentive for defendants to take measures to 
clean up toxic hazards in the neighborhoods most affected by lead 
paint,” which has a more pernicious long-term effect on low-income 
minority neighborhoods.169 
Complex discrimination also injures the entire subgroup; 
discrimination against a Black woman injures Black women. The 
most obvious injury is in the perpetuation of stereotypes that 
negatively define “otherness” and are used to permit and ignore 
discrimination against Black women. The Mammy stereotype, for 
example, has been used by those engaging in racialized sexual 
harassment to debase and humiliate Black women experiencing such 
an assault.170 The Sapphire trope blames Black women for the 
emasculation of Black males, along with poverty, crime, and 
unemployment,171 and gives support for violence, sexual and 
otherwise against Black women.172 And the myth of the Black 
Jezebel, which rose out of the tension between the Victorian notions 
of chastity and weakness and the commoditization of Black female 




 167. See Too Hungry to Learn: Food Insecurity and School Readiness, Children’s 
Healthwatch Research Brief, CHILDREN’S HEALTHWATCH (Sept. 3, 2013), 
http://www.childrenshealthwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/toohungrytolearn_report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7V6V-CBXJ]. 
 168. See Martha Chamallas, Civil Rights in Ordinary Tort Cases: Race, Gender, and the 
Calculation of Economic Loss, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1435, 1440 (2005) (citing Jennifer 
Wriggins, Genetics, IQ, Determinism, and Torts: The Example of Discovery in Lead 
Exposure Litigation, 77 B.U. L. REV. 1025 (1997); Laura Greenberg, Note, Compensating 
the Lead Poisoned Child: Proposals for Mitigating Discriminatory Damage Awards, 28 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 429 (2001)). 
 169. Chamallas, supra note 168, at 1441. 
 170. Carolyn M. West, Violence, in 3 BLACK WOMEN IN AMERICA 281, 281 (Darlene 
Clark Hine ed., 2d ed. 2005). 
 171. MAYERI, supra note 155, at 25. 
 172. West, supra note 142, at 281–82 (noting that violence was an “appropriate 
punishment for their ‘emasculating’ behavior”). 
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silence their resistance.173 Just like the other structural inequities 
identified above, stereotyping—which is employed regardless of 
whether it actually applies to an individual woman174—operates as the 
bridge between institutional bias and individual subjugation.175 
Just as categorization, stereotyping, and subjugation injures the 
victim, her community, and her subgroup, it also has a negative effect 
on all women. Paulette Caldwell explains: 
Stereotypes and negative images of black women serve many 
functions. They separate black and white women from each 
other, and limit all women’s choices by perpetuating competing 
ideologies of womanhood based on race.	.	.	. The black woman’s 
invisibility serves to blind all women and all blacks to the 
interactive relationship between race and gender, leads to the 
development of legal theories and social policies directed at 
either race or gender without fully considering the implications 
of such theories and policies, and ultimately assures the 
perpetuation of domination on the basis of race and gender for 
all women and members of subordinated race.176 
Compounded stereotypes—another way to define intersectional 
discrimination rooted in stereotypes—negatively affect all women and 
perpetuate gender inequality.177 Of course, it should also be said that 
when a Black woman endures discrimination, all Blacks are injured. 
And one could apply the cluster framework to assert a race-sex 
discrimination claim wholly within race discrimination. For the 
 
 173. For a full discussion of the relationship between the Jezebel myth and racialized 
sexual harassment in housing, see Elengold, supra note 21, at 236–45. 
 174. See REBECCA J. COOK & SIMONE CUSACK, GENDER STEREOTYPING: 
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 10 (2010). 
 175. See id. at 9 (“All the dimensions of personality that make that individual unique 
are consequently filtered through the lens of a generalized view or preconception of the 
group with which the individual is identified.” (footnote omitted)). A stereotype operates 
to conceal, or at least dull, each individual’s unique attributes, traits, and characteristics. 
The concealment, rooted in stereotype, occurs regardless of whether individual members 
of the group possesses the attributes of the stereotype, id.; in that way, all individuals in a 
group become subjected to institutionalized and structural bias rooted in the stereotypes 
of that group. 
 176. Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and 
Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 395. 
 177. COOK & CUSACK, supra note 174, at 29 (asserting that compound stereotypes 
“impede the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women and the realization 
of substantive equality”); see also Mari J. Matsuda, Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: 
Legal Theory Out of Coalition, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1189 (1991) (discussing both the 
difficulty and necessity of coalition-building, “[a]s we look at these patterns of oppression, 
we may come to learn, finally and most importantly, that all forms of subordination are 
interlocking and mutually reinforcing”). 
96 N.C. L. REV. 457 (2018) 
494 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96 
reasons already discussed herein, this Article uses the sex 
discrimination claim to illustrate the cluster framework. 
Clare Dalton’s exposition on contract doctrine is instructive in 
understanding that binary categorization is harmful to both the in-
group and the out-group.178 Dalton identifies dualities present in the 
development of contract law to explore the ways that structuring law 
and legal analysis in dualities operates to mask, rather than solve, the 
problems of unequal access to power and knowledge in contract.179 
Drawing on feminist theory, Dalton calls attention to the images of 
women and relationships in the cases she analyzes. She discusses how 
contract cases embed the image of a woman as either an angel or a 
whore.180 That dichotomy operates to distribute power and is a force 
that is hidden behind the traditional dualities of contract doctrine. 
Dalton exposes the way that images and stereotypes (i.e., angel or 
whore) are implicated in the way that laws and doctrine develop over 
time.181 Analogizing Dalton’s work to antidiscrimination doctrine, it is 
clear that the interaction of categorization and stereotyping in sex 
discrimination cases operates to both directly subjugate certain 
categories of women and indirectly keep all women in their 
stereotyped boxes. A woman is either a mother or not a mother. She 
is a woman of color or she is White. If she is not an angel, she must be 
a whore; if she is not a whore, she must be an angel. Both 
categorizations, while different, place women in impossible and unfair 
boxes.182 Because each of these categorizations is, itself, a binary 
separation, each category is defined as related to one another.183 
 
 178. Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 95 YALE L. J. 
997, 1000 (1985). 
 179. Id.  
 180. Id. at 1110–12.  
 181. Id.  
 182. See Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529, 541–43 (Cal. 1971) (overturning liquor 
licensing law that excluded women bartenders and recognizing that “[t]he pedestal upon 
which women have been placed has all too often, upon closer inspection, been revealed as 
a cage”). Stereotypes do not have to be objectively negative to lead to subjugation. See 
Peggy Li, Hitting the Ceiling: An Examination of Barriers to Success for Asian American 
Women, 29 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 140, 149 (2014) (recognizing that “history 
[has] shaped the perception of Asian American women as outsiders, ultra-feminine lotus 
blossoms, dragon ladies, and model minorities” and that “[t]hese stereotypes, both 
positive and negative, have contributed to discrimination against Asian American 
women”). 
 183. In reality, identities are not binary. Not every mother had a child by vaginal birth 
or cesarean section; she might have adopted or used a surrogate. And one need only look 
at the various identifications for gender or race or color to realize that identity (and 
reaction to identity) is not binary. The import of this discussion is that identities are 
regularly pitted against each other in a binary fashion. Much has been written about the 
ubiquitousness, power, and danger of the Black/White binary in law and society. See, e.g., 
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Because of that oppositional relationship, categorization and 
categorical stereotypes operate to constrain both the in-group and 
out-group categories in the binary. 
As previously noted, discrimination based on a racial subgroup 
of women (e.g., Black women) is different than discrimination based 
on another subgroup of women (e.g., mothers).184 The difference is 
due, in part, to America’s history of subordination of women based 
on race and the systemic perpetuation of White supremacy and Black 
subjugation.185 In fact, we must be cognizant that those in the “in-
group” may benefit from the stereotyping of or bias against those in 
the “out-group.”186 Not all women bear the burden of categorization, 
stereotyping and subjugation equally; women of color, and Black 
women in particular, have carried the burden of sexual violence, sex 
discrimination, and forced silence across our nation’s history.187 The 
 
Roy L. Brooks & Kirsten Widner, In Defense of the Black/White Binary: Reclaiming A 
Tradition of Civil Rights Scholarship, 12 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 107, 112–15 
(2010); Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The “Normal Science” 
of American Racial Thought, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1213, 1214–16 (1997). More recently, 
scholars have exposed a slightly different binary understanding of race—minority/White. 
Carlos Hiraldo, Arroz Frito with Salsa: Asian Latinos and the Future of the United States, 
15 ASIAN AM. L.J. 47, 50 (2008); Imani Perry, Of Desi, J. Lo and Color Matters: Law, 
Critical Race Theory the Architecture of Race, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 139, 140 (2005). 
 184. See supra notes 22–26 and accompanying text; infra notes 184–87. 
 185. See Elengold, supra note 21, at 258–69 (identifying the “structural forces inherent 
in residential sexual harassment that have operated [throughout American history], 
together with the myth of the Black Jezebel, to perpetuate the sexual subjugation of Black 
women in the private sphere”). 
 186. See, e.g., Robert J. Smith, Justin D. Levinson & Zoe Robinson, Implicit White 
Favoritism in the Criminal Justice System, 66 ALA. L. REV. 871, 891 (2015) (recognizing 
the positive effects of implicit bias on members of privileged groups, i.e., “implicit white 
favoritism,” in the criminal justice system). Although White women may, in fact, benefit 
from the stereotyping and subjugation of Black women, an injustice remains in the way 
that stereotypes limit women’s control and autonomy. COOK & CUSACK, supra note 174, 
at 20 (explaining that although the process of categorization is a necessary way to make 
sense of the complicated world, categorization carries great risk, especially when 
stereotyping “operates to ignore individuals’ characteristics, abilities, needs, wishes, and 
circumstances in ways that deny individuals their human rights and fundamental freedoms 
and when it creates gender hierarchies”). 
 187. HARRIS-PERRY, supra note 138, at 162–63 (2011) (discussing the historical use of 
sexual assault and sexual harassment of Black women as a form of “social terrorism”). As 
a White woman writing in this sphere, I am particularly cognizant of the dangers of co-
opting the voices of women of color. I have previously disclosed the following: 
As a former civil rights lawyer who litigated [residential sexual harassment cases], 
this [Article] is meant to highlight the importance of remaining client-centered in 
legal representation. For a discussion on the history and development of the client-
centered representation model, see Katherine R. Kruse, Fortress in the Sand: The 
Plural Values of Client-Centered Representation, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 369 (2006). 
There is a reality of White men and women litigating discrimination cases on 
96 N.C. L. REV. 457 (2018) 
496 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96 
import of the harm analysis therefore is not in recognizing the injuries 
themselves, but is in (1) illuminating the way that approaches to 
remedying race-sex discrimination can draw on strategies, tools, and 
favorable case law analyzing other subgroup discrimination,188 and (2) 
harnessing the political power for justice “when we recognize that we 
all have a stake” in striking down patterns of oppression, “including 
the illegitimate use of categories.”189 The final Part of this Article 
applies the lessons of intersectionality theory, post-intersectionality 
theories, and the insights of the cluster framework to an 
antidiscrimination case. 
IV. APPLYING THE INSIGHTS OF INTERSECTIONALITY THEORY TO 
SHIFT THE CIVIL RIGHTS DOCTRINE 
Returning to Tametra Moore’s story, remember that Tametra is 
Black and she is female.190 Recall that Tametra sued her employer for 
race discrimination and sex discrimination under Title VII, based on 
the sexual harassment she experienced at the hands of her 
supervisor.191 Part and parcel of the harassment was racial animus, 
exposed in the stereotyping of the Black women her supervisor 
harassed.192 And then, remember that Tametra lost her suit. Using 
Tametra’s story and experience in court to provide perspective, this 
Part proposes means of implementing the insights of intersectionality 
 
behalf of people of color, as I have done throughout much of my career. While I 
take issue with the historical and structural forces that have created that disparity, 
this Article attempts to remind all lawyers, and most specifically White lawyers, to 
listen to their clients’ stories and goals and not ignore the impact of race, even in 
the face of a standard stock story that excludes race. 
Elengold, supra note 21, at 238 n.48. I am concerned that this Article could be 
misconstrued as something of an “All Lives Matter” reaction to racialized sexual 
harassment. That is not my intention. Rather, I envision a scenario where the presentation 
of a race-sex discrimination claim as sex discrimination, if done with the client at the 
forefront, will give voice to a woman experiencing intersectional discrimination and an 
opportunity to seek compensation that recognizes and remedies the burden she bears in 
her individual experience of race-sex discrimination. For a further explanation of how to 
lift up the voices of the affected women, see infra Section IV.B. 
 188. See Carbado, supra note 111, at 1496–97 (noting that comparability arguments can 
be useful, but dangerous and recognizing that “[f]acial comparisons of race and sexual 
orientation obscure important history”). 
 189. Kwan, supra note 102, at 1280–81 (“[C]osynthesis offers the view that political 
emancipation and the achievement of justice are realizable only when we recognize that 
we all have a stake in finding ways to seize control over the legal and cultural forces that 
shape and maintain systems of oppression, including the illegitimate use of categories.”). 
 190. Moore Compl., supra note 1, at 1–2. 
 191. Id. 
 192. See id. at	3. 
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theory, through the cluster framework, to shift antidiscrimination 
doctrine in a way that can better account for complex plaintiffs and 
intersectional discrimination. It offers three concrete implementation 
proposals for shifting the civil rights doctrine—for courts, advocates, 
and agencies. Specifically, this Part proposes that courts look beyond 
the “sex plus” doctrine, that advocates think critically about the role 
of race in developing case theory and making damages demands, and 
that agencies take a less formulaic approach to assessing 
discrimination claims. 
A. Courts: Intersectional Discrimination is More Than “Sex Plus” 
This Article suggests that shifting to a cluster framework can do 
some work toward overcoming the barriers that have existed for civil 
rights plaintiffs asserting intersectional bias. Specifically, bringing 
intersectional discrimination claims wholly within a single 
discrimination rubric will thwart the courts’ instinct to silo claims and 
evidence of discrimination. It will also avoid the false “but for” test 
sometimes applied to multiple claims of discrimination. And if 
plaintiffs seek damages commensurate with the full extent of their 
injuries, the law can develop with a respect for the disproportionate 
burden that certain subgroups have carried historically and today. 
Some may wonder why the cluster theory is different from or 
better than the existing “sex plus” doctrine. The “sex plus” doctrine, 
first recognized by the Supreme Court in the 1971 Phillips v. Martin 
Marietta Corp.193 decision, recognizes a Title VII violation where an 
employer discriminates against a subclass of women because of their 
sex plus another characteristic.194 “Sex plus” claims are generally seen 
in employment discrimination actions but have also been asserted in 
claims arising under the Equal Protection Clause,195 Title IX,196 and 
state statutes.197 Although at one point the “sex plus” doctrine 
 
 193. 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam). 
 194. Id. at 544. The Supreme Court in Phillips did not explicitly call the discrimination 
“sex plus” and that terminology has never been adopted by the highest court. See E. 
Christi Cunningham, The Rise of Identity Politics I: The Myth of the Protected Class in Title 
VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 30 CONN. L. REV. 441, 474 (1998). 
 195. See, e.g., Back v. Hastings On Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 118–
19, 121 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 196. See, e.g., Tingley-Kelley v. Trs. of the Univ. of Pa., 677 F. Supp. 2d 764, 774–75 
(E.D. Pa. 2010). 
 197. See, e.g., Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 374 F.3d 428, 431–32 (6th Cir. 2004); 
Johnston v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. 08–CV–0296, 2009 WL 2900352, at *8–10 (D. 
Minn. Sept. 2, 2009); Schmittou v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. Civ.011763, 2003 WL 
22075763, at *8 (D. Minn. Aug. 22, 2003); Pullar v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 701, Hibbing, 582 
N.W.2d 273, 276–78 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998). 
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provided some hope for a more holistic, intersectional analysis to 
discrimination,198 the doctrine is confused and confusing.199 Courts 
have both recognized and rejected the “sex plus” doctrine in cases 
involving sex plus motherhood,200 sex plus marital status,201 sex plus 
race,202 and sex plus age.203 As such, it provides little guidance to 
courts on how to interpret and address complex discrimination. 
In addition to its practical flaws, the “sex plus” doctrine is 
fundamentally flawed as an answer to the insights of Crenshaw’s 
intersectionality theory. Defining race-sex discrimination (or other 
forms of intersectional discrimination) under “sex plus” ignores the 
insights of intersectionality theory that intersectional identity is not an 
additive experience; intersectional discrimination, in other words, 
cannot be broken into its component parts and added to one another. 
Therefore, courts should be careful to avoid viewing race-sex 
discrimination under the “sex plus” doctrine. The cluster framework 
offers an alternate approach. 
Returning to our race-sex discrimination example, the cluster 
framework specifically defines sex discrimination to include the 
categorization, stereotyping, and subjugation of particular subgroups 
of women. That definition is squarely within the standard 
antidiscrimination laws.204 When a landlord targets Black women for 
 
 198. See, e.g., Shazor v. Prof’l Transit Mgmt., Ltd., 744 F.3d 948, 957 (6th Cir. 2014) 
(recognizing that plaintiff’s sex bias claim “cannot be untangled from her claim for race 
discrimination”); see also Jefferies v. Harris Cty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1034 
(5th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Dillard’s Inc., C/A No. 3:03-3445-MBS, 2007 WL 2792232, at 
*3–5 (D.S.C. Sept. 24, 2007); Berndt v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs., No. C03-3174, 2005 WL 
2596452, at *7–8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2005). 
 199. See Cunningham, supra note 194, at 473–77. 
 200. Compare Towers v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Stony Brook, No. CV-04-5243, 2007 
WL 1470152, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 21, 2007) (recognizing gender plus motherhood claim), 
with Guglietta v. Meredith Corp., 301 F. Supp. 2d 209, 214 (D. Conn. 2004) (holding that 
child-rearing was not a “sex-plus” characteristic to be considered under Title VII). 
 201. Compare Rauw v. Glickman, No. CV-99-1482-ST, 2001 WL 34039494, at *7–9 (D. 
Or. Aug. 6, 2001) (evidence of sex plus marital status raised a genuine issue of material 
fact), with Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 70 F.3d 1420, 1433–34 (2d Cir. 1995) (rejecting a sex-plus-
marital status claim), rev’d en banc, 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 202. Compare Johnson v. Dillard’s Inc., C/A No. 3:03-3445-MBS, 2007 WL 2792232, at 
*6 (D.S.C. Sept. 24, 2007) (recognizing a sex-plus-race claim on behalf of a Black woman), 
with Judge v. Marsh, 649 F. Supp. 770, 779–81 (D.D.C. 1986) (rejecting a sex plus claim on 
behalf of a Black woman). 
 203. Compare Gorzynski v. Jetblue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 109–10 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(recognizing that a sex-plus-age claim under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act is cognizable), with Flaherty v. Metromail Corp., 59 F. App’x. 352, 354–
55 (2d Cir. 2002) (rejecting a sex-plus-age claim under Title VII). 
 204. See, e.g., United States v. Starrett City Ass’n, 840 F.2d 1096, 1098, 1101–03 (2d Cir. 
1988) (finding racial distribution quotas illegal under the federal Fair Housing Act). 
96 N.C. L. REV. 457 (2018) 
2017] CLUSTERED BIAS 499 
sexual harassment but does not target White women, that is sex 
discrimination.205 When an employer fails to promote a woman who 
acts too aggressively, that is sex discrimination.206 When a company 
refuses to hire a woman because she is pregnant, that is sex 
discrimination.207 The language of “sex plus” obscures the reality of 
sex discrimination and sexism. The definition and implementation of 
the cluster framework, as discussed herein, treats discrimination 
against a subset of women as “pure” sex discrimination—no plus 
needed. Such a construction better encompasses the purpose and 
meaning behind the antidiscrimination statutes and will avoid falling 
prey to the varied whims of local courts in determining what should 
or should not count as a “plus” factor. If a woman is treated 
differently because she is a woman, that is sufficient to find sex 
discrimination. If a subgroup of women is treated differently because 
they are women, that is sex discrimination. Tametra was the victim of 
sex discrimination. From the beginning, feminists have taught us to 
understand sex discrimination broadly and inclusively, even when the 
bad action does not negatively affect all women; it is time we, as a 
group, apply such principles consistently and emphatically to women 
of color. 
B. Advocates: Tell Her Story and Demand Damages 
Just because Tametra was a victim of sex discrimination does not 
mean that she must ignore the clear effect of race on her experience 
of sex discrimination. Civil rights jurisprudence has failed 
intersectional plaintiffs because it artificially silos evidence of 
discrimination into protected classes and relies on stock stories to 
explain and understand the discrimination. Advocates can break that 
cycle by using the power of legal storytelling—a concept embraced by 
 
 205. In the related cases of United States v. Gumbaytay, 757 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (M.D. 
Ala. 2010), and Boswell v. Gumbaytay, No. 2:07-CV-135-WKW, 2009 WL 1515872 (M.D. 
Ala. June 1, 2009), several of the victims of the sex discrimination claim asserted that the 
sexual harassment was race-motivated. See Plaintiff United States’ Memorandum of Law 
in Opposition to Defendant Gumbaytay’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Evidence at 
Julian Declaration, at 1, United States v. Bahr, No. 2:08-cv-00573 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 28, 
2009); id. at Kemp Declaration, at 1; id. at Williams Declaration, at 2. The same is true in 
the housing and lending discrimination case of United States v. First National Bank of 
Pontotoc, No. 3:06–cv–00061 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 19, 2008), where at least twenty-seven 
victims complained of race-motivated sexual harassment. See Joint Stipulation Regarding 
Distribution of Settlement Fund at Affidavit Nos. 2–9, 11–24, 26–30, United States v. First 
Nat’l Bank of Pontotoc, No. 3:06-cv-00061 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 19, 2008). 
 206. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250–52 (1989). 
 207. 42 U.S.C. §	2000e(k) (2012) (including “pregnancy” within the definition of sex 
discrimination). 
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scholars across legal disciplines208—to peel back the cover of 
stereotype and expose the plaintiff’s unique attributes, experience, 
and damages. This Part posits that, at every critical step along the 
litigation path—complaint, answer, discovery, motion practice, 
opening statement, trial testimony, closing statement, and, where 
applicable, a settlement agreement or consent decree209—a victim of 
intersectional discrimination can tell a story of sex discrimination that 
does not ignore or subjugate the effect of race on that experience of 
sex discrimination.210 
1.  Personalizing Case Theory 
Case theory is the “storyline” of the case; “the short version of 
the lawyer’s story of the case that takes into account the context in 
which it is told.”211 In cases like Tametra’s, where race is part and 
parcel of her experience of sex discrimination and sexual harassment, 
 
 208. In both feminist and critical legal studies’ scholarship, scholars have used stories 
to humanize, personalize, explain, augment, or supplant traditional legal discourse. See 
Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971, 982 (1991) (stating that 
varied feminist narrative approaches share “a preference for the particularity of 
description, a belief that describing events or activities ‘from the inside’—that is, from the 
perspective of a person going through them—conveys a unique vividness of detail that can 
be instructive to decisionmakers”); Caldwell, supra note 176, at 365–71 (applying a similar 
approach in critical race theory scholarship). 
 209. I recognize that the majority of women who experience sex discrimination do not 
litigate and, when they do litigate, do not bring cases all the way to trial. Many do not 
report the abuse, many have no access to lawyers, and, even when filed in a court of law, 
most civil cases settle. Thinking about discrimination in this way, however, has broader 
transformational effect. For example, consent decrees often include equitable relief that 
affect every woman coming through the defendant’s business and public scrutiny may lead 
to policy change, attitude shift, or general public education. See Kramer, supra note 62, at 
947 (“[W]e should not think of antidiscrimination law only as a means to right wrongs. In 
addition to remedying specific cases of discrimination, antidiscrimination law also 
facilitates a critical conversation about identity and difference—a conversation that takes 
place in workplaces, in courts, in the media, and in people’s daily lives.”). 
 210. This is not an endorsement for creating a new stock story. Rather, the power of 
narrative in the courtroom is that the lawyer and the client can work together to develop 
the case theory that works best for the client. See Ahmad, supra note 73, at 122 
(recognizing that legal narratives are “flexible and contingent, subject to the choices that 
lawyers and clients make as to what to include and what to exclude, what to foreground 
and what to background” (citing Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1303 (1995)). Whether or not to utilize stock stories or even 
subordinating narratives to the benefit of the client is a complicated decision and requires 
appropriate counseling and ethical assessment. See id. This Article does not suggest that a 
lawyer should force her client into telling a story of race-sex discrimination if that is not 
the path that the client chooses. Rather, it challenges lawyers to have those conversations 
with their clients and, as part of the collaborative strategizing around case theory, to think 
about both the narrow and broad implications of ignoring race in a case of race-sex 
discrimination, including cases of racialized sexual harassment. 
 211. Binny Miller, Teaching Case Theory, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 293, 298 (2002). 
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her case theory must succinctly define the characters, relationships, 
and motivations.212 In doing so, she could choose to push back on the 
stock story and explain how her subgroup (Black women) made her 
particularly vulnerable to and affected her experience of sex 
discrimination and sexual harassment.213 
In Tametra’s case, her attorney proposed and agreed to a siloed 
approach to assessing race discrimination and sex discrimination.214 In 
the lawyer’s closing statement, for example, the sole connection 
between his client’s sex and race discrimination claims he drew for the 
jury was: “I do believe that the evidence has shown that she was 
sexually harassed; that it was to a certain extent racially motivated.”215 
There was no discussion of the specifics of the sexual harassment and 
no discussion of the way that race was part and parcel of the 
harassment.216 While it is impossible to know the thought process 
behind such a strategy without an honest conversation with Tametra’s 
lawyer,217 perpetuating a story that silos the evidence ignores that 
Tametra’s experience of sexual harassment was intricately connected 
to her experience as a Black woman. Not only does the choice 
constrain Tametra, but, by failing to push back on the racialized 
aspect of her experience, it reinforces the separation between race 
and sex, ignores harmful stereotyping, and perpetuates case law 
devoid of an understanding of complex discrimination. 
Tametra’s lawyer could have considered alternate case theories, 
including telling a complex discrimination story through a sex 
discrimination claim. Considering the place of intersectional 
discrimination—the role of racial animus in sex discrimination 
 
 212. Id. (discussing case theory through the narrative, rather than analytical lens, 
“provides an explanation for what happened, and in doing so, shapes what happened”). 
 213. Not every client will want to tell the story of racialized sexual harassment or 
racialized sex discrimination. In following a client-centered approach, a lawyer should 
discuss the pros and cons of moving forward with an alternate storyline. STEPHEN 
ELLMAN ET AL., LAWYERS AND CLIENTS: CRITICAL ISSUES IN INTERVIEWING AND 
COUNSELING 22 (2009); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4(a)(2) (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 2017) (“A lawyer shall .	.	. reasonably consult with the client about the means by 
which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished .	.	.	.”). 
 214. See Joint Proposed Pretrial Order, Exhibit E at 14–17, Moore v. Cricket 
Commc’n, Inc., No. 4:09-cv-03310 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2011), ECF No. 48-5. 
 215. Transcript of Trial Day 4 of 4 at 28:23–25, Moore v. Cricket Commc’n, Inc., No. 
4:09-cv-03310 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2011), ECF No. 67. 
 216. Id. 
 217. The public record did not include trial transcripts from the first three days of trial, 
which included all of the live testimony. Without that information, it is impossible to know 
which facts and allegations did or did not come into evidence. The lawyer may have been 
hamstrung by the evidence. Another possibility is that the lawyer and his client chose to 
focus on the sexual harassment to the exclusion of race for strategic reasons. 
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cases—at all stages in the investigation and litigation of the action 
would operate as a constant reminder to advocates and attorneys not 
to ignore the intersectional experience of their clients. Tametra’s 
lawyer, for example, might have considered the following case theory: 
Tametra’s manager, Travis, discriminated against Tametra based on 
her sex, using every vulnerability he could identify against her to 
intimidate and harass her, including his status as her supervisor and 
racialized stereotyping. Tametra’s experience of sexual harassment, 
both because she had to endure the harassment and because of Travis’s 
reliance on historical legacies of racism and sexual abuse of Black 
women to excuse his conduct, caused Tametra great emotional distress.  
Should Tametra want to proceed with such a case theory, at every 
critical locus—as represented in the factual sections of the complaint, 
briefing, opening statement, trial testimony, closing argument, 
damages demand, and, where applicable, settlement agreement—the 
attorney should articulate a viable sex discrimination claim of 
subgroup discrimination without losing sight of the effect of race on 
her client’s experience. 
Narrative has long been part of sex discrimination claims and 
litigation strategy.218 Individualized narrative is a tool to push back on 
stock stories and stock characters that are rooted in stereotype and 
universal experience. Leigh Goodmark, for example, challenges 
advocates to avoid distilling complicated domestic violence stories 
down to the stock story for the sole purpose of attaining a protection 
order.219 She calls for a rewriting of the victim narrative, a willingness 
to tell a counter-narrative story with confidence and in collaboration 
with client.220 And Regina Austin has issued a parallel call to action of 
Black women and other women of color to push back on standard 
tropes and recast stock characters. In Sapphire Bound!, Austin 
challenges her female colleagues of color to “get truly hysterical” and 
to “take on the role of ‘professional Sapphires’ in a forthright 
way.	.	.	.”221 She also recasts the central character in Chambers v. 
Omaha Girls Club222 from a Black feminist perspective, naming the 
motivating stereotypes in the case and retelling the story from a 
different perspective. Civil rights advocates and scholars can learn a 
lesson from Austin’s willingness and ability to push against stereotype 
 
 218. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 151, at 21–26. 
 219. Goodmark, supra note 76, at 76–77. 
 220. Id. at 127–29. 
 221. Austin, supra note 79, at 542. 
 222. 629 F. Supp. 925, aff’d, 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987), reh’g denied, 840 F.2d 583 
(1988). 
96 N.C. L. REV. 457 (2018) 
2017] CLUSTERED BIAS 503 
and offer a parallel narrative with characters recast. By viewing sex 
discrimination as the categorization, stereotyping, and subjugation of 
subgroups of women, we open a door for scholars and advocates to 
tell a story of race-sex discrimination. Through storytelling and 
“restorying,”223 claimants, advocates, and scholars can introduce and 
ingrain civil rights jurisprudence with a deeper understanding of 
complex discrimination. With each telling and retelling of stories of 
race-sex discrimination and racialized sexual harassment, we may 
begin to explode the silos of the civil rights statutes. We may make 
inroads with the court, individual jury members, the media, the client, 
and/or with ourselves to better understand intersectionality and 
complex bias and discrimination. 
2.  Damages Implementation: Connecting Individual Story to 
Individual Damages 
Considering that one thrust of this Article is to recast the stock 
story of sex discrimination to account for intersectional 
discrimination, advocates should also consider recasting the role of 
damages as a tool in that project. Because civil rights remedies 
contemplate and permit damages arising directly from the individual 
plaintiff’s experience of discrimination, plaintiffs like Tametra should 
be fully compensated for their experiences of sexual harassment, 
including any injury that arose from the racialized nature of the 
harassment. 
Courts have found that a victim of discrimination may seek 
damages for actual, economic, or out-of-pocket costs,224 and also for 
 
 223. Leslie Espinoza & Angela P. Harris, Afterword: Embracing the Tar-Baby—Latcrit 
Theory and the Sticky Mess of Race, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1585, 1631–32 (1997). Espinoza 
challenges scholars and advocate to tell and retell stories with new voices, rhythms, and 
characterizations, posting that, through such stories, the legal community can begin to defy 
the dominant racial paradigm. She explains that “[with] each telling and retelling, both 
listener and speaker are better able to construct a meaning for their own individual life 
and to sort through false visions of our individual stories and of the cultural stories that 
constrain us.” Id. at 1632. 
 224. The Fair Housing Act, for example, explicitly recognizes that persons aggrieved 
by the perpetrator’s discrimination may be awarded relief, including actual damages, 
injunctive, or other equitable relief. 42 U.S.C. §	3612(g)(3) (2012). Section 3612(g)(3) 
arises under an administrative law forum in which the aggrieved person is seeking relief. 
Section 3612(o) applies that same remedy analysis to actions brought on behalf of the 
United States under §	3612(a). Id. §	3612(o); see also id. §	3613(c) (in a civil action brought 
directly in state or federal court under the Fair Housing Act, the plaintiff may be awarded 
“actual and punitive damages”); id. §	3614(d)(1)(B) (court may award monetary damages 
to aggrieved person harmed by pattern or practice of discrimination established in an 
action brought under the Fair Housing Act pursuant to §	3614). The Fair Housing Act 
defines “aggrieved person” as “any person who—(1) claims to have been injured by a 
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the embarrassment, humiliation, and shame experienced due to the 
defendant’s discriminatory conduct.225 In Broome v. Biondi,226 a case 
of race discrimination in housing, for example, plaintiff Shannon 
Broome testified she felt “embarrassed” and “humiliated” by the 
approval process and the denial of her application to sublet an 
apartment227 and plaintiff Gregory Broome testified that he felt 
“angry” and “demoralized” by the hostile manner in which he was 
treated, including his submission to an “interrogation” by the co-op 
board.228 The jury awarded the plaintiffs $230,000 in compensatory 
damages, primarily for emotional distress, and $410,000 in punitive 
damages.229 Upholding the damages awards, the Broome court 
catalogued emotional distress damages in similar discrimination cases 
and determined that, in assessing emotional distress damages, courts 
“must rely primarily on case-specific facts relating to the severity of 
the discriminatory behavior and duration of the resulting emotional 
damage.”230 The court also recognized that “the genuine emotional 
pain associated with such discrimination should not be devalued by 
unreasonably low compensatory damage awards, especially when one 
 
discriminatory housing practice; or (2) believes that such person will be injured by a 
discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur.” Id. §	3602(i). Analog state statutes 
similarly permit damages awards to individual victims of housing discrimination. See, e.g., 
N.C. Gen. Stat. §	41A-7 (2015). The Civil Rights Act of 1991, extended the protections of 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include the right to sue for compensatory and 
punitive damages in cases of intentional discrimination. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 
No. 102-166, sec. 102, §1977A, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072–74 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§	1981(b)(2012)). 
 225. See, e.g., United States v. Balistrieri, 981 F.2d 916, 930 (7th Cir. 1992) (affirming 
damages award to fair housing “testers,” who experienced upset, humiliation, 
embarrassment, and shame when they discovered, after their interaction with defendants, 
that they had been treated less favorably because of their race); Littlefield v. McGuffey, 
954 F.2d 1337, 1348–49 (7th Cir. 1992) (affirming a jury award of $50,000 in compensatory 
damages and $100,000 in punitive damages based on a finding that defendant rejected Ms. 
Littlefield as a tenant because of her boyfriend’s and daughter’s races, crediting plaintiff’s 
testimony about the negative effect of racially-animated death threats); Sec’y, U.S. Dept. 
of Hous. & Urban Dev. ex rel. Herron v. Blackwell, 908 F.2d 864, 872–73 (11th Cir. 1990) 
(upholding a jury award for actual economic losses and emotional distress, for plaintiffs 
unable to purchase a home because of their race, recognizing the relationship between the 
“humiliation and embarrassment” plaintiffs suffered and the compensatory damages 
award); Woods-Drake v. Lundy, 667 F.2d 1198, 1203 (5th Cir. 1982) (reversing the district 
court’s finding of no liability or damages when defendant landlord conditioned plaintiffs’ 
tenancy on an agreement to no longer accept Black guests and directing the lower court to 
“award plaintiffs an amount which will fairly compensate them for [their] emotional 
distress,” including “embarrassment and humiliation they suffered”). 
 226. 17 F. Supp. 2d 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) 
 227. Id. at 223–28 (citing Transcript at 190–91). 
 228. Id. (citing Transcript at 89–90, 92–93, 177, 168, 189–90). 
 229. Id. at 223–28. 
 230. Id. at 225. 
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considers the difficulty a plaintiff faces in establishing that he or she 
was a victim of housing discrimination.”231 Courts around the country 
have similarly acknowledged the individual nature of emotional 
distress and compensatory damages for discrimination, as well as the 
necessity of sufficient compensatory awards.232 
The greater the distress, the greater the damages.233 The 
individual experiences of humiliation, shame, or degradation should 
be directly proportional to the award of compensatory, or emotional 
distress, damages.234 Because the civil rights statutory schemes and 
related case law assess a victim’s evidence of humiliation, 
degradation, and shame to award emotional distress damages, victims 
of sex discrimination, based on racial subgroup, should be 
compensated accordingly.235 Tametra should be compensated for the 
humiliation, shame, and degradation she experienced at Travis’s 
hands. Tametra may have experienced feelings of humiliation and 
 
 231. Id. at 226. 
 232. See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 151, at 21–26. 
 233. United States v. Balistrieri, 981 F.2d 916, 932 (7th Cir. 1992) (“The more 
inherently degrading or humiliating the defendant’s action is, the more reasonable it is to 
infer that a person would suffer humiliation or distress from that action; consequently, 
somewhat more conclusory evidence of emotional distress will be acceptable to support an 
award for emotional distress.”). 
 234. See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 151, at 21–26. This is also true in sexual 
harassment cases. See, e.g., Banai v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 102 F.3d 
1203, 1207 & n. 4 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that “anger, embarrassment, and emotional 
distress are clearly compensable injuries under th[e] [FHA],” which permits recovery of 
“actual damages” including “compensation for the victim’s injuries”); Boswell v. 
GumBayTay, No. 2:07-CV-135, 2009 WL 1515912, at *7 (M.D. Ala. June 1, 2009) (citing 
42 U.S.C. §	3613(c)(1) (2012)); Tafoya v. State Human Rights Comm., 311 P.3d 70, 79 177 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2013) (recognizing that the plaintiff “suffered emotional distress because 
of David’s conduct, which embarrassed and humiliated her and made her afraid in her 
own home”). It is also in keeping with traditional tort remedies, where compensatory 
damages are designed to compensate a person for a legally recognized loss and courts 
explain to a defendant that he must “take the plaintiff as he finds him.” DAN B. DOBBS, 
LAW OF REMEDIES 210 (2d ed. 1993). 
 235. This Article is not advocating for a hierarchy of damages awards based on race or 
any other factor. This Article focuses its attention on race-sex discrimination because race 
has often been ignored in the context of sex discrimination, because racial stereotypes 
have motivated and infected sex discrimination, including sexual harassment, and because 
there is a history of depressed awards to Black plaintiffs. The idea of individualized story-
telling, combined with a thoughtful and unique approach to damages demands, can be 
applied in other contexts. If a woman in a wheelchair is sexually harassed by her landlord 
and, as part of the sexual harassment, the landlord refuses to consider giving the woman a 
first-floor apartment, her lawyer could apply the concepts in this Article to present an 
intersectional disability-sex case through the lens of a sex discrimination claim. Further, 
her lawyer may argue that her client’s experience of sexual harassment caused her to feel 
shame, degradation, and emotional distress at a heightened level because of the landlord’s 
abuse of her disability and that she should be duly compensated. 
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shame when her supervisor made sexually explicit comments to her or 
showed her a photograph of his exposed penis in his office. She may 
have also experienced a sense of degradation when Travis asked her if 
she had ever been with a White man, discussed the size of his penis 
relative to other White men, and told her “Black women got better 
pussy than white women.” Those feelings of degradation, humiliation, 
and shame are wrapped up in Tametra’s individual experience of 
racialized sexual harassment, her personal history, and America’s 
national history of perpetuating a stereotype of Black women as 
lascivious Jezebels.236 
Developing individual case theories and asking for damages 
commensurate with a story of complex discrimination breaks down 
stereotypes and pushes back on a system that has too often measured 
damages by the valuation of the recipient, grounded in race- and sex-
based stereotypes.237 In criminal and civil cases, quantitative and 
qualitative evidence establishes that women and minorities fare worse 
than men and Whites.238 That is true even where race is not explicitly 
 
 236. See HARRIS-PERRY, supra note 138, at 53–69; Austin, supra note 79, at 570; 
Roberts, supra note 143, at 11–12. Black women, of course, are not the only women 
subjected to cultural myths that increase their vulnerability to harassment or subjugation. 
Cf. Llezlie Green Coleman, Exploited at the Intersection: A Critical Race Feminist Analysis 
of Undocumented Latina Workers and the Role of the Private Attorney General, 22 VA. J. 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 397, 404 (2015) (“Latina immigrant workers may also experience 
subjugation based upon cultural narratives that inform their experiences both at home and 
at work.”). 
 237. See MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF 
INJURY: RACE, GENDER, AND TORT LAW 1, 2–5 (2010) (“[W]hen viewed though a wider 
cultural lens, the basic structure of contemporary tort law still tends to reflect and 
reinforce the social marginalization of women and racial minorities and to place a lower 
value on their lives, activities, and potential.”); AUDREY CHIN & MARK A. PETERSON, 
DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY POCKETS, WHO WINS IN COOK COUNTY JURY TRIALS 3, 26, 32 
(1985) (studying 9,000 civil cases in Cook County, Illinois between 1960 and 1979 and 
finding that Black litigants had a lower chance of success in jury trials, and that Black 
plaintiffs received smaller awards than non-Black plaintiffs, averaging less than half of the 
median award and only 40 percent of the average award for non-Black plaintiffs); 3 DAN 
B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN, & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS §	479 (2d ed. 
2011). 
 238. In rape and sexual assault cases, prosecutors, judges, and juries appear to value 
the social harm resulting from the rape of a Black woman less than the social harm 
resulting from the rape of a White woman. See Pokorak, supra note 136, at 38–43; cf. 
Crenshaw, supra note 25 at 1269 (citing Race Tilts the Scales of Justice. Study: Dallas 
Punishes Attacks on Whites More Harshly, DALL. TIMES HERALD, Aug. 19, 1990, at A1); 
Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know About Race 
and Juries? A Review of Social Science Theory and Research, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 997, 
998 (2003) (citing DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH 
PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 143 (1990) (discussing a study finding 
that defendants in more than 2,000 Georgia capital murder cases were 4.3 times more 
likely to receive the death penalty if the victim was White than if the victim was Black)). 
96 N.C. L. REV. 457 (2018) 
2017] CLUSTERED BIAS 507 
part of the case.239 Certain scholars have suggested that race-
conscious discourse in the law may actually break the application of 
negative racial stereotypes. In part because the evidence suggests that 
race and gender stereotypes seep into the outcomes of cases 
regardless of express discussion, this Part posits that such research 
offers hope to plaintiffs willing to explicitly allege, argue, and demand 
damages commensurate with their experience of race-sex 
discrimination. By using “race-conscious talk,” rather than “race-
neutral” or “race-coded”240 talk, legal actors may “exploit, and at 
times .	.	. thwart, bias .	.	.	.”241 Addressing race explicitly can recast 
ideas about race and racial identity and might interrupt the 
factfinder’s instinct to apply racial stereotypes and biases without 
thinking.242 Explicitly discussing the injury of the racialization of sex 
discrimination may also create a cultural bridge between the judge or 
juror and the victim of race-sex discrimination.243 
Advocates representing intersectional plaintiffs can take 
concrete steps to tell the client’s story of racialized sex discrimination 
in court and to ask for damages commensurate with her story. For 
example, in investigating a case like Tametra’s, the lawyer could ask 
her client questions about how her race was a part of her sexual 
 
Similar results accrue in studies of sentencing disparities. See Sommers & Ellsworth, supra 
note 238, at 1006 (citing Kitty Klein & Blanche Creech, Race, Rape, and Bias: Distortion of 
Prior Odds and Meaning Changes, 3 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 21 (1982)).There 
are similar accounts in civil tort cases. See CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 237, at 
2–5. 
 239. See CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 237, at 33; CHIN & PETERSON, supra 
note 237, at 3, 26, 32. 
 240. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Objecting to Race, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1129, 1137 
(2014) (defining race-conscious talk as discourse that “discerns extant racial consciousness 
in law and in the social and political construction of color among individuals, groups, and 
communities”). 
 241. Id. (looking specifically at criminal law trials). 
 242. See id. at 1157 (“The integration of race-conscious reasoning into civil rights .	.	. 
advocacy .	.	. requires confronting and naming race in the lawyering and criminal justice 
process, and recasting racial identity .	.	.	.”); Frank M. McClellan, The Dark Side of Tort 
Reform: Searching for Racial Justice, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 761, 797 (1996) (“[T]alking 
about race can defeat rather than promote racism.”). 
 243. See Victor M. Goode & Conrad A. Johnson, Emotional Harm in Housing 
Discrimination Cases: A New Look at a Lingering Problem, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1143, 
1174–75 (2003) (relying on psychological studies that suggest that Whites are driven by 
cultural biases, known and unknown to them, Goode and Johnson come to several 
conclusions, including that “even reluctant whites can be brought around to non-racist 
behavior through an institutional approach that vigorously and actively promotes those 
values and carefully monitors transgressions”); cf. Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen, supra note 
114, at 602–03 (relying on Marc Fajer’s proposal to “‘re-tell’ personal narratives of gay and 
lesbian people in order to ‘counter and demonstrate’ homophobic stereotypes” and “offer 
‘new perspectives’ into legal discourse”). 
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harassment and how she felt about all parts of her experience with 
her supervisor. Her lawyer could draft a complaint that includes 
factual allegations representative of her client’s experience and injury, 
not just the facts sufficient to make out a pure sex discrimination 
claim. She could ask about her client’s emotions on the stand and 
consider putting on an expert witness to discuss the history of racial 
stereotyping around sex and sexuality and its emotional toll on 
individuals and communities. In drafting the jury instructions on 
damages, her lawyer could use the case law on individual damages to 
step outside of model jury instructions. And in closing argument, her 
lawyer might pull the case theory together for the jury, explaining 
why her client’s injury based on the sexual assault cannot be 
separated from the racial animus embedded in the assault. 
C. Agencies: The Form as a Starting, not Ending Point 
Finally, agencies have a role in adequately understanding and 
analyzing claims and charges of complex discrimination. Tametra 
Moore’s experience with the EEOC is representative and instructive. 
As required, she filed an Intake Questionnaire with the EEOC.244 
Unrepresented by counsel, Tametra provided her personal 
information, checking the “African-American” race box.245 In 
responding to the question about the basis for her discrimination, she 
checked the boxes for “sexual harassment” and “harassment.”246 
Although Tametra included fourteen handwritten pages detailing her 
experience of discrimination, calling attention to aspects of racial 
harassment and sexual harassment, Tametra did not check the “race 
discrimination” box.247 The EEOC issued Tametra a notice-to-sue 
letter charging sexual harassment and retaliation.248 Based on 
Tametra’s decision not to check the “race discrimination” box on her 
EEOC Intake Questionnaire, the defendant sought summary 
judgment on her Title VII race discrimination claim.249 The defendant 
argued that Tametra failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, a 
requirement to proceed under Title VII.250 Citing a string of 
 
 244. Moore EEOC Intake Questionnaire, supra note 10. The EEOC form has changed 
marginally since 2009, when Ms. Moore filled out her questionnaire. For the current form, 
see U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 83. 
 245. Moore EEOC Intake Questionnaire, supra note 10, at 3. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Moore Compl., supra note 1, at 2. 
 249. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 13–14, Moore v. Cricket 
Communications, Inc., No. 4:09-cv-03310 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2010), ECF No. 14. 
 250. Id. 
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analogous cases, the defendant argued that “[a] Title VII claim may 
only be based on the specific complaints in the Charge submitted to 
the EEOC,” with the exception of “claims that are ‘like or related to 
the [C]harge’s allegations,’ limited by the ‘scope of the EEOC 
investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the 
[C]harge of Discrimination.”251 The defendant explained: 
Plaintiff did not include a claim of race discrimination on her 
EEOC Intake Questionnaire, checking only the boxes for sex 
discrimination and retaliation. Consistent with Plaintiff’s 
limited allegations of sex discrimination and retaliation, the 
Notice of Charge of Discrimination to Cricket states the issues 
of the Charge are Harassment and Sexual Harassment and does 
not discuss any race discrimination claim or mention the word 
‘race.’ Under such circumstances, Plaintiff’s race discrimination 
claim is not related to her sex harassment claim or retaliation 
claim and was not within the scope of the EEOC’s investigation 
of Plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff failed to exhaust her 
administrative remedies as to her race discrimination claim. 
Accordingly, this Court does not have jurisdiction over the 
claim and it must be dismissed as a matter of law.252 
The Moore court denied defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment.253 The court found that Tametra was not limited to the 
types of discrimination expressly checked in her Intake 
Questionnaire.254 The Moore court explicitly recognized that the 
procedure set forth in Title VII was “not designed for the 
sophisticated or the cognoscenti, but to protect equality of 
opportunity among all employees and prospective employees.”255 
Although the Moore court ultimately recognized the claim of 
race discrimination in Tametra’s EEOC Intake Questionnaire,256 
courts do not uniformly excuse discrepancies between the 
administrative forms and claims of discrimination.257 Further, the 
 
 251. Id. at 13 (citing DeJesus-Harris v. Blockbuster Video, No. SA-04-CA-1099-XR, 
2006 WL 262051, at *10 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 5, 2006)). 
 252. Id. at 14. 
 253. Moore v. Cricket Commc’ns, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 2d 853 (S.D. Tex. 2011). 
 254. Id. at 859. 
 255. Id. at 860 (citing Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 463 (5th 
Cir.1970)). 
 256. Id. 
 257. See, e.g., Miles v. Dell, Inc., 429 F.3d 480, 491–92 (4th Cir. 2005) (affirming 
dismissal of retaliation claim where the plaintiff “did not check the retaliation box on her 
charge form, and the narrative explaining her charge made no mention of retaliation”); 
Luna v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 54 F. App’x 404, 2002 WL 31687698, at *1 (5th Cir. Oct. 
22, 2002) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision) (stating that because plaintiff “failed 
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summary judgment briefing underscores the problem with the 
procedure at its origination—the administrative agency. Defendants 
are relying on the administrative exhaustion requirement, which is 
rigidly formulaic, to escape otherwise meritorious discrimination 
actions. The most obvious solution would be to eliminate the 
exhaustion requirement in Title VII to mirror the administrative 
process in the Fair Housing Act.258 In the absence of a legislative 
change, there is another simple solution. The form should eliminate 
the check boxes with respect to the reason or basis for the 
complainant’s claim of discrimination. And complaints should be 
further encouraged to describe their evidence of discrimination in a 
narrative. Taken together with the personal demographic information 
already sought on the form, the agency will be tasked with 
investigating and charging the discrimination. Because the 
investigators presumably have more familiarity with the law of 
employment or housing discrimination, they will be better situated 
than pro se complainants to assess the bases on which a discrimination 
action might be pursued.259 Then, the complainant can decide upon 
which basis or bases to proceed. 
The proposed solution is a simple change to the form. It is in 
keeping with the statutory scheme, which contemplates that EEOC 
and HUD investigators will consider, at a substantive level, the 
 
to mark the box indicating his intention to bring a claim of national origin 
discrimination.	.	.	. [He] failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to that claim”); 
Thomas v. Tex. Dep’t. of Criminal Justice, 220 F.3d 389, 395 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that 
plaintiff could not proceed with a race discrimination claim because her EEOC Charge of 
Discrimination was limited to sex discrimination); Cohens v. Md. Dep’t of Human Res., 
933 F. Supp. 2d 735, 743 (D. Md. 2013) (dismissing retaliation claim where the plaintiff 
“neither checked the ‘retaliation’ box on her EEOC charge nor alleged retaliation in the 
charge’s factual summary”). 
 258. See 42 U.S.C. §	3610 (2012) (providing for an administrative resolution but not 
requiring administrative exhaustion prior to filing a private action in state or federal 
court). 
 259. While this might cause some additional burden on the government, it is the kind 
of burden and expense that is contemplated in the statutory scheme. The HUD Fair 
Housing Enforcement Office manual, for example, states: “The investigation of a 
complaint filed under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 .	.	. consists of gathering 
and analyzing facts regarding a complainant’s allegations and the respondent’s defenses 
with respect to the alleged discriminatory housing practice or policy to determine whether 
there is reasonable cause to believe that the respondent violated the Fair Housing Act.” 
TITLE VIII COMPLAINT INTAKE, INVESTIGATION, AND CONCILIATION HANDBOOK 
(8024.1), Ch. 7, https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/80241C7FHEH.PDF [https://perma.cc
/CA8N-W9VB]. But see DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., EVALUATION OF FHEO 
HOUSING DISCRIMINATION COMPLAINT PROCESSING AND COMPLIANCE (2008), 
https://www.hudoig.gov/sites/default/files/documents/IED-07-001.pdf [https://perma.cc
/9XMA-9QXW] (identifying problems with HUD’s fair housing investigations pursuant to 
complaints filed). 
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complainant’s allegations.260 It does not prejudice the potential 
defendant or defendants because they are on notice of the alleged 
events and can foresee the potential claims that arise from the 
allegations. It is also in keeping with the traditional requirements of 
the federal rules261 and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on 
pleading.262 
In addition to, and certainly in the absence of, implementing the 
revised form, the agencies should provide additional information to 
complainants about the relationship between the standard intake 
forms, the charge of discrimination, and any resulting federal claims. 
That information is currently absent. 
CONCLUSION 
Rights-based antidiscrimination law has failed to achieve 
equality on many fronts. One front is the failure to integrate the 
insights of intersectionality theory in any meaningful way. But rights-
based antidiscrimination law remains the primary tool for fighting 
discrimination in the workplace, housing, the classroom, the bank, 
and hotels across this country. It is with that understanding that this 
Article considers how to use the current antidiscrimination scheme to 
best address and remedy intersectional discrimination. With our 
consciousness raised by the insights and critiques of intersectionality 
theory, the door is now open to a new perspective for understanding 
and addressing intersectionality and intersectional discrimination 
within the traditional confines of antidiscrimination law. The cluster 
framework—by refining the vision of intersectional discrimination, 
relocating intersectional discrimination within that vision, defining 
discrimination in a way that accounts for the categorization, 
stereotyping, and subjugation of subgroups of protected classes, and 
understanding the injuries of complex discrimination—acts as a 
roadmap for people of all colors to take up the cause of fighting 
intersectional discrimination. 
 
 260. §	2000e-5 (requiring investigation for Title VII charges); id. §	3610 (requiring 
investigation of a Fair Housing Act complaint). 
 261. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a “short and plain statement of 
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 262. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (holding that a complaint must 
plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged”); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 
545 (2007) (holding that notice pleading does require enough factual allegations to “raise a 
right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint’s 
allegations are true”). 
